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It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property
Rights in Personal Information
Vera Bergelson

Abstract

”It’s Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal Information”
discusses the disturbing erosion of privacy suffered by the American society in
recent years due to citizens’ loss of control over their personal information. This
information, collected and traded by commercial enterprises, receives almost no
protection under current law. I argue that, in order to protect privacy, individuals
need to secure control over their information by becoming its legal owners. In
this article, I confront two fundamental questions that have not been specifically
addressed in the privacy literature before: why property is the most appropriate
regime for regulating rights in personal information, and why individuals have a
stronger moral claim to personal information than its collectors. Recognizing that
individual rights may not be absolute, I further propose a way to balance them
with rights of collectors and public at large, explore a range of legal and practical implications the new rules may create, and make suggestions regarding the
enforcement of information privacy rights.
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INTRODUCTION
1

When in 1993 The New Yorker published its now famous cartoon
showing a dog surfing the web and telling another dog, “On the Internet,
nobody knows you’re a dog,” we laughed because the “information
superhighway” seemed a place where everyone was totally anonymous.
Today, looking at that same cartoon, we find amusing the proposition
itself and laugh, if at all, at our own past naiveté.
The computer revolution has dramatically affected our privacy by
making it possible to record, store, and process every scrap of personal
2
3
information we leave behind. In the course of our everyday activities,
we routinely reveal our names, addresses, and social security numbers as
well as our financial decisions, health problems, tastes, habits, political
4
and religious affiliations, sexual orientation, hobbies, and love affairs.
For decades, companies have collected such information and used it
5
internally for marketing or research and development. The growth of
computer technology in the 1990s allowed them to distribute the data far
6
and wide and promoted the development of a new phenomenon  a
1
Peter Steiner, Cartoon, “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog,” NEW YORKER,
July 5, 1993, at 61.
2
I am using the terms “personal information” and “personal data” interchangeably
and in the meaning assigned to the term “personal data” in the European Union Data
Protection Directive (i.e., “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person” where an identifiable person is “one who can be identified, directly or indirectly,
in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to
his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”). See Council
Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995 Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data
Protection Directive]; see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-17,
at 966 (1978) (defining “personal information” as any information which identifies or
relates to specific individual).
3
Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 205 (1992) (“It is probably not commonly known
that credit card companies develop lifestyle profiles of card holders, that
telecommunications companies track users’ calling patterns, that product manufacturers
track the habits of individual customers, and that credit reporting agencies also assemble
data on household composition (such as marital status of occupants) and on legal disputes
involving individuals.”).
4
See Adam L. Penenberg, The End of Privacy, FORBES, Nov. 29, 1999, at 1 (describing
experiment pursuant to which Penenberg hired web detective and asked him to find as
much information as possible about Penenberg using only phone and computer). The
results of the experiment were rather shocking. It took the detective only a few days to
uncover “the innermost details of my life  whom I call late at night; how much money I
have in the bank; my salary and rent.” Id. The detective also uncovered Penenberg’s
unlisted phone numbers and a record of monthly payments to his psychotherapist. Id.
5
This Article also refers to such companies as “primary collectors.”
6
See Penenberg, supra note 4, at 1.
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7

secondary market in which personal information itself became a
8
valuable commodity. Today, billions of dollars are made annually from
9
the sale of mailing lists alone, and the direct-marketing industry
10
continues to grow.
The expansion of the market for personal information resulted in the
unprecedented erosion of individual privacy. The value of a personal
information database depends to a large degree on how precisely it
captures a segment of a community with well-defined purchasing
susceptibilities. For that reason, lists brokers began to focus on more and
11
more private and sensitive characteristics of people’s lives. Such
specialized lists may include names of men who called various phonesex numbers; gay and lesbian magazine subscribers; women who
requested free samples of adult diapers; or men who sought medical
12
help for impotency.

7
This Article refers to companies that obtain personal information in the secondary
market as “secondary collectors.” In addition, this Article sometimes refers to both
primary collectors and secondary collectors as “collectors” generally.
8
See, e.g., Native Forest Network, Native Forest Network’s Guide to Stop Junk Mail, at
http://www.nativeforest.org/stop_junk_mail/nfn_junk_mail_guide.html
[hereinafter
Native Forest Guide] (estimating that value of each name is typically worth 3 to 20 cents each
time it is sold); see also Walter W. Miller, Jr. & Maureen A. O’Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v.
Privacy Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card?, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 779 (2001) (noting that,
in many cases, e-commerce company’s most valuable asset is its customer database).
9
See William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal
Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 956 (1996) (stating that “[t]he annual market for
mailing lists alone, without factoring in sales attributable to their use, has been estimated at
approximately $3 billion.”).
10
The direct-marketing industry employs more than eighteen million people and is
growing at a rate estimated at twice that of the United States’ gross national product. See
ARTHUR M. HUGHES, THE COMPLETE DATABASE MARKETER 5 (rev. ed. 1996) (discussing
expansion of database marketing and direct marketing); Fenrich, supra note 9, at 956; Scott
Foster, Online Profiling Is on the Rise: How Long Until the United States and the European
Union Lose Patience With Self-Regulation?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 260 (2000)
(discussing online profiling and impact of self-regulation); see also U.S. News & World
Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No. 95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518, at *1 (Va. Cir. June 13, 1996)
(noting that, in 1995, direct marketing accounted for approximately one trillion dollars of
revenues generated for goods and services).
11
See Judith Waldrop, The Business of Privacy, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct. 1994, at 46, 49
(noting that people who meet sensitive and personal criteria have particularly good chance
of being on list); see also Mary Zahn & Eldon Knoche, Electronic Footprints: Yours Are a Lot
Easier to Track Than You May Think, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 1995, at 1A (“Any
lesbian or a diabetic has a good chance of being on a list. A Jew has an excellent chance of
making some marketing list.”).
12
See Zahn & Knoche, supra note 11, at 1A; see also Fenrich, supra note 9, at 953 n.17
(discussing lists that are routinely sold by list brokers, including names of following
people: more than 300,000 men who called various phone fantasy numbers; 55,912 gay and
lesbian magazine subscribers; 5,000 women who responded to 800 phone number offering
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Over the years, various privacy groups and members of the general
public have voiced concerns that people in this country have lost all
13
Scholars from diverse
control over their personal information.
backgrounds have supported these concerns, pointing out that existing
laws are insufficient to protect privacy and fall far behind the
14
developmental trajectory of information technology. Under the current
law, individuals neither own their personal information, nor have a
15
recognized privacy interest in it.
Thus, on the one hand, they are
powerless to prevent its unauthorized dissemination, and on the other,
they are excluded from its profitable commercial exchange. In other
words, individuals have all the downside and practically no upside of
the commodification of personal information.
This Article takes the position that, in order to protect privacy,
individuals must secure control over their personal information by
becoming its real owners. Similar views have already been expressed in
a number of legal and non-legal publications concerning information
16
privacy.
While making an important contribution to the privacy
debate, the vast majority of those publications have focused primarily on
the social utility of granting individuals property rights in personal
information. This Article adopts a somewhat different approach.
The first half of this Article reviews the current treatment of personal
information by industries (Part I) and law (Part II), and briefly addresses
the constitutionality of expanding individual rights in personal

information and samples of adult diapers (this list sold for $270); and 82,000 men 55 and
older who sought help for impotency at medical clinics).
13
See Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy; Privacy Regulation in National Networks,
COMM. OF THE ACM, Sept. 1996 at 92, 94 (reporting that, according to Equifax poll, 76% of
U.S. citizens believe they have lost all control over personal information); see also
Penenberg, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing how, due to development of computer technology
“America, the country that made ‘right to privacy’ a credo, has lost its privacy to the
computer”).
14
See Penenberg, supra note 4, at 1 (reporting that scholars specializing in history,
sociology, business, and political science have all concluded that current privacy laws are
insufficient and outdated); see also A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1461, 1462 (2000) (arguing that unprecedented variety of technologies collect personal
information in ever-increasing variety of contexts).
15
See discussion infra Part II.
16
See, e.g., Laudon, supra note 13, at 92; Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63-65 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999); Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of
Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1,
26-41 (1996); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic
Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in
Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (2003).
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information (Part III). Against this background, I confront two related
normative questions that have not yet been specifically addressed in the
privacy literature: why the property regime is the most appropriate
regime for regulating rights in personal information (Part IV); and why
individuals have a stronger moral claim to personal information than
collectors (Part V). In my view, exploring these two questions is
essential for building a foundation for a comprehensive theory of
information privacy.
In the second half of this Article, I seek to translate my normative
arguments into legal rules and propose a way to balance the rights of
individuals, collectors, and the public at large (Part VI); explore a range
of legal and practical implications that the new rules may create (Part
VII); and conclude with some suggestions regarding the enforcement of
individual rights in personal information (Part VIII). My research
focuses only on the relationship between individuals and commercial
17
enterprises, not the government, and only on the kind of identifiable
personal information that individuals provide or make visible
incidentally to entering into a transaction or utilizing services of these or
other enterprises.
I. REALITY CHECK: WHAT HAPPENS TO OUR PERSONAL INFORMATION?
“I bought the Social Security numbers of John Ashcroft, CIA Director
George Tenet and Karl Rove for $26 each on the Internet,” relates Jamie
18
Court.
“Their home addresses and telephone numbers cost a little
more. For $295, another Internet service says it will sell me bank account
19
balances.”
The development of computer technology and of the Internet raised
the collection, processing, and further use of personal information to a
20
new level. It is now both technologically possible and economically

17
In most instances, principles and solutions suggested in this paper apply to public
entities as well. A Department of Motor Vehicles, for example, should have no more right
to sell personal information supplied by its customers than does a drugstore. However,
certain governmental agencies, dealing for instance with law enforcement, may have
additional rights and limitations. Those rights and limitations are outside the scope of this
Article.
18
MarketPlace: Interview with Jamie Court (Minn. Pub. Radio broadcast, July 16,
2003). Jamie Court is a consumer activist and co-author (with Michael Moore) of
CORPORATEERING: HOW CORPORATE POWER STEALS YOUR PERSONAL FREEDOM. . . AND
WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2003).
19
MarketPlace: Interview with Jamie Court (Minn. Pub. Radio broadcast, July 16,
2003).
20
See Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 146 CONG. REC. S7656-68 (daily
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viable to capture and store for long periods of time information about
minute, transient aspects of peoples’ lives  information that before the
computer revolution was simply lost or immobilized on “remote
mainframes that were difficult to access, even for the techies who put it
21
there.”
Today, computers hold half a billion bank accounts, half a
billion credit card accounts, hundreds of millions of mortgages,
22
retirement funds, and medical claims, as well as information about
consumers’ purchases, travel, hobbies, sexual orientation, and religious
23
and political affiliations.
This data comes from a variety of sources: online and offline purchase
records, supermarket savings cards, white pages, surveys, sweepstakes
and contest entries, financial and property records, U.S. Census data,
motor vehicle registration information, credit card transactions, phone
records, product warranty cards, the sale of magazine and catalog
24
subscriptions, and public records. In addition, Internet retailers (“etailers”) use more subtle methods of data collection such as offering
25
customers free Internet access and free e-mail. Another widespread
ed. July 26, 2000) (statement of Sen. McCain). Senator McCain argued:
The ability of the internet to aid business in the collection, storage, transfer, and
analysis of information about a consumer’s habits is unprecedented. While this
technology can allow business to better target goods and services, it also has
increased consumer fears about the collection and use of personally identifiable
information.
Id.; see also Mary Culnan, Online Privacy Alliance, Privacy and the Top 100 Sites: A
Report to the Federal Trade Commission, available at http://www.msb.edu/faculty/culnanm/
gippshome.html (June 1999) (finding that 98% of major computer websites collect personal
information).
21
Penenberg, supra note 4, at 1.
22
See id. (describing variety of personal information that is available on web and
predicting that “[a]s e-commerce grows, marketers and busybodies will crack open a cache
of new consumer data more revealing than ever before.”).
23
See Waldrop, supra note 11, at 49 (noting that Standard Rate and Data Service
mailing-list catalog that is widely used by direct-marketing industry includes lists
reflecting customers’ “religion, sexual orientation, medical information and political
contributions”).
24
See EPIC Privacy and Consumer Profiling, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/
(last updated Sept. 25, 2002) (listing sources of personal information available to collectors);
see also FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (1999)
(discussing different direct methods of data collection); Foster, supra note 10, at 259
(discussing ways to collect personal information from Internet users).
25
See Deborah Kong, GM Offers a “Honey” of a Deal on Net Service, S.J. MERCURY NEWS,
Jan. 14, 2000, at 1C (quoting NetZero’s chairman Mark Goldston, who stated that company
uses “the free access, the free e-mail, as the honey to attract bees,” and pointed out that
technology companies use it “like a GPS tracking system. The minute you come on, it
knows who you are, it knows where you go.”).
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form of inconspicuous tracking of personal data is through the use of
26
“cookies” which allow a web site provider to monitor every page on its
site that users visit, every online advertisement that they view, and every
27
mouse click that they make.
Major advertisement services, such as
DoubleClick, Inc., now use cookies to monitor and profile Internet users’
28
activities on any site where the company places its advertisements.
The end result of direct and indirect tracking of consumer behavior,
purchases, and exchanges of information in the secondary market, as
29
well as data sharing by affiliates of multi-profile companies, is that
collectors now have data on broad segments of the population. At its
recent workshop, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has reported that
30
some collectors have data on most of the U.S. population. More
importantly, collectors are in a position to compile various consumer
data from different sources to form comprehensive profiles of

26
A cookie is a set of data that a website server gives to a browser the first
time the user visits the site. HIGH TECH DICTIONARY, available at http://www.currents.net
/resources/dictionary/index.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2003). It is updated with each
return visit. The remote server saves the information about the user contained in the
cookie. The user’s browser does the same and stores the information as a text file in the
Netscape or Explorer system folder. See, e.g., id.
; see also EPIC Public Opinion on Privacy, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/ (last
updated Sept. 25, 2002) (“Many Internet users cannot identify the most basic tracking tool
on the Internet: the cookie. In an August 2000 study conducted by the Pew Internet and
American Life Project, 56% of Internet users could not identify a cookie.”); Steve Lohr,
Internet Companies Set Policies to Help Protect Computer Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at
C1 (reporting that 56% of Internet users could not explain what a “cookie” is).
27
No Hiding Place, ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 2003, available at www.economist.com
(reporting that almost every website attempts to plant “cookies” on your computer 
“[y]our every move on the internet is being recorded by someone, somewhere.”).
28
See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Honing in on Privacy; As Databases Collect Personal Details
Well beyond Credit-Card Numbers, It’s Time to Guard Yourself, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2000, at H1
(explaining that cookies provide information about behavior patterns of computer users,
often without their knowledge).
29
See Martin Abrams, Executive Director of the Center for Information Policy and
Leadership, Hunton & Williams, Federal Trade Commission Public Workshop, The
Information Marketplace: Merging and Exchanging Consumer Data (Mar. 13, 2001), quoted in
Robert Gellman, Privacy, Consumers, and Costs: How the Lack of Privacy Costs Consumers and
Why Business Studies of Privacy Costs are Biased and Incomplete, available at
http://www.epic.org/reports/dmfprivacy.html#2 (Mar. 2002) (“The data comes from
many, many sources. As we discussed, some of them are public record sources. Some of
them are surveys. Some of them are purchase data, but the data comes from many sources,
not a single source.”).
30
Id. (“Aggregators have data on a broader population. Some aggregators have most
of the U.S. population.”); see Zahn & Knoche, supra note 11, at 1A (reporting that company,
which deems itself world’s leading broker and manager of Jewish lists, claims it “can
identify and mail to 85% of the 2.6 million Jewish households in the United States”).
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31

individuals, their lifestyles and preferences.
In the personal data market, the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts. For example, a partnership between Kmart and Yahoo! allowed
the two companies to apply the real-world data that Kmart had collected
from eighty-five million households to targeted marketing on the
32
Internet. In addition, the recent merger of DoubleClick, Inc., the largest
advertising network on the web, with Abacus Direct Corporation, which
runs America’s largest database of catalog-buying behavior, made it
31

Profiling companies have well-developed lexicons to classify individuals. Claritas,
for instance, divides individuals into fifteen different groups, which are in turn categorized
into various subgroups. These include:
• “Elite Suburbs” (Blue Blood Estates, Winner’s Circle, Executive Suites, Pools &
Patios, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs);
• “Urban Uptown” (Urban Gold Coast, Money & Brains, Young Literati, American
Dreams, Bohemian Mix);
• “2nd City Society” (Second City Elite, Upward Bound, Gray Power);
• “Landed Gentry” (Country Squires, God’s Country, Big Fish Small Pond, Greenbelt
Families);
• “Affluentials” (Young Influentials, New Empty Nests, Boomers & Babies, Suburban
Sprawl, Blue-Chip Blues);
• “Inner Suburbs” (Upstarts & Seniors, New Beginnings, Mobility Blues, Gray
Collars);
• “Urban Midscale” (Urban Achievers, Big City Blend, Old Yankee Rows, Mid-City
Mix, Latino America);
• “2nd City Center” (Middleburg Managers, Boomtown Singles, Starter Families,
Sunset City Blues, Towns & Gowns);
• “Exurban Blues” (New Homesteaders, Middle America, Red White and Blues,
Military Quarters);
• “Country Families” (Big Sky Families, New Eco-topia, River City USA, Shotguns
and Pickups);
• “Urban Cores” (Single City Blues, Hispanic Mix, Inner Cities);
• “2nd City Blues” (Smalltown Downtown, Hometown Retired, Family Scramble,
Southside City);
• “Working Towns” (Golden Ponds, Rural Industria, Norma Rae-ville, Mines and
Mills);
• “Heartlanders” (Agri-Business, Grain Belt); and
• “Rustic Living” (Blue Highways, Rustic Elders, Back Country Folks, Scrub Pine
Flats, Hard Scrabble).
See EPIC Privacy and Consumer Profiling, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/ (last
updated Sept. 25, 2002).
32
See Kalinda Basho, The Licensing of Our Personal Information: Is It a Solution to Internet
Privacy, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1507, 1508 n.4 (2000) (quoting Ken Magill, Kmart, Yahoo Deal a
Databaser’s Dream?, MARKETING NEWS, Dec. 24, 1999, at 1). Kmart chairman Floyd Hall
stated that Kmart has the capability to figure out not only what type of toothpaste a
consumer will buy but also what brand, how much, and what items they will be interested
in buying in the future. See id.
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possible to bring together anonymous clickstream data “from the five
billion ads DoubleClick serves per week and the two billion personally
33
identifiable consumer catalog transactions recorded by Abacus.”
At the time of the merger, DoubleClick’s customer database, according
to the company’s chief privacy officer, included profiles on forty to fifty
34
million Internet users.
Today, DoubleClick reportedly maintains
35
cookies on one hundred million Internet users.
DoubleClick’s
announcement that it plans to combine its data with that of Abacus has
outraged privacy-rights advocates. This has prompted a series of
36
lawsuits filed in several state and federal courts around the country,
and an FTC investigation of the company’s practice of profiling web
37
users without adequate disclosure.
Although the FTC eventually
closed its investigation without action, a coalition of ten states pursued
DoubleClick’s practices and forced the company to accept a binding
agreement regarding privacy policies and disclosure, and required the
company to pay a fine of $450,000 to reimburse the states’ investigative
38
costs.

33
Courtney Macavinta, DoubleClick, Abacus Merge in $1.7 Billion Deal (Nov. 24, 1999), at
http://www.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1463444.html?tag+st.ne.1002
(pointing
out
potential effects of DoubleClick’s merger on privacy groups and Internet marketing
industry).
34
John T. Acquino, Senate Online Profiling Hearing Suggests Movement Toward Federal
Legislation, E-COM. L. WKLY. (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.law.com/servlet
/ContentServer?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/View&c=LawArticle&cid=1015973967
146&live=true&cst=1&pc=0&pa=0 (citing testimony of DoubleClick’s chief privacy officer
Jules Polonetsky to U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation).
35
No Hiding Place, supra note 27, at 8 (discussing immense capacity of DoubleClick’s
database).
36
Courtenay Youngblood, Case Notes and Comments: A New Millennium Dilemma:
Cookie Technology, Consumers, and the Future of the Internet, 11 J. ART & ENT. L. 45, 53-54
(2001) (exploring DoubleClick’s lawsuit, which focused on need for enhanced consumer
privacy protection on Internet).
37
See Acquino, supra note 34 (discussing FTC investigation of DoubleClick and
testimonies of advertisement companies to U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation concerning use of personal information in online profiling).
38
See In the Matter of DoubleClick: Agreement between the Attorneys General of the States of
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Vermont, and Washington and DoubleClick (Aug. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug26a<uscore>02<uscore>attach.pdf;
Press Release, N.Y. State Att’y Gen., Major Online Advertiser Agrees to Privacy Standards
for Online Tracking (Aug. 26, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002
/aug/aug26a<uscore>02.html; see also Andrea Petersen, DoubleClick Reverses Course After
Privacy Outcry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2000, at B1 (reporting that DoubleClick decided to
suspend its plan of combining databases with Abacus until government and industry
develop guidelines on what practices are appropriate for collection of personal information
through Internet).
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A recent wave of bankruptcy filings and business liquidations by
39
numerous dot-coms raised another question: may a bankruptcy trustee
sell consumer data in an effort to maximize the size of the estate
available for unsecured creditors even if such sale would violate the
40
insolvent company’s privacy policy? “That question exploded into the
collective consciousness when Toysmart.com, an e-tailer of educational
toys, sought to sell its customer list in bankruptcy despite its promise
41
never to share such data.”
At the time of its bankruptcy in June, 2000, Toysmart’s customer
42
database contained information on approximately 250,000 individuals,
including “name, address, billing information, shopping preferences,
order history, gift registry selections, [and] family profile information
about consumers’ children, such as name, gender, birthday, and toy
43
interests.”
Toysmart sought to sell the database as part of its
44
bankruptcy estate. It even ran an ad in the Wall Street Journal that read,
“We will sell you our data. We will sell you the names and addresses
45
and family profiles of everyone who is registered with our site.” There
would have been nothing unusual in such a sale but for Toysmart’s
explicit promise to its customers never to share their personal
46
information with a third party.

39
See Luis Salazar, FTC Takes Action, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 9, 2000, at B6 (citing expectations
for “deluge of Internet bankruptcies” and estimating that as many as 75% of e-tailers will
fail); see also Victoria Slind-Flor, Privacy or Creditors: Who Holds the Trump?, NAT’L L.J., Sept.
4, 2000, at A1 (listing dot-coms going out of business).
40
See Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 8, at 792 (using Toysmart’s bankruptcy as example
of recent bankruptcy filings).
41
Id. at 780.
42
Matt Richtel, Toysmart.com in Settlement with F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2000, at C1,
C14 (discussing large size of Toysmart’s consumer database).
43
In re Toysmart.com, L.L.C., No. 00-13995-CJK, Stipulation and Order Establishing
Conditions on Sale of Customer Information (D. Mass. July 21, 2000) [hereinafter Stipulation and
Order], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/toysmartbankruptcy.1.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2003).
44
See Toysmart.com’s Plan to Sell Consumer Data is Challenged by FTC, WALL ST. J., July
11, 2000, at C8, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3035966 (discussing Toysmart.com’s plan to
violate its privacy agreement with its consumers).
45
See Glenn R. Simpson, FTC Is Set to Challenge Toysmart.com to Prevent the Sale of
Consumer Data, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2000, at A3 (reporting on Toysmart’s attempt to sell its
customer database); see also Gary M. Schober et al., Colloquium on Privacy & Security, 50
BUFF. L. REV. 703, 717 (2002) (quoting text of ad but incorrectly attributing it to New York
Times).
46
First Amended Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief ¶ 8,
F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, L.L.C., Civ. Action No. 00-11341-RGS, (D. Mass. July 21, 2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/us/ 2000/07/toysmartcomplaint.htm (last visited Mar. 1,
2003). Toysmart provided that:
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The FTC filed a complaint, arguing that such a sale would constitute a
deceptive practice prohibited by Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
47
Commission Act. In addition, the attorneys general of a number of
states intervened in bankruptcy proceedings under their respective
48
consumer protection acts.
Over vigorous objections of thirty-eight
49
attorneys general, the FTC and Toysmart reached a settlement that
50
permitted the company to sell its customer database. The case was
finally resolved when one of Toysmart’s investors agreed to purchase
51
and destroy the list. The questions the case raised, however, remain far
from resolution.
The Toysmart bankruptcy, just like the DoubleClick-Abacus merger,
attracted significant public attention and once again raised the problem
of the inadequacy of current privacy laws and the need for
52
comprehensive federal legislation protecting personal information.

Personal information voluntarily submitted by visitors to our site, such as name,
address, billing information and shopping preferences, is never shared with a
third party. All information obtained by Toysmart.com is used only to
personalize your experience online. . . . When you register with Toysmart.com,
you can rest assured that your information will never be shared with a third
party.
Id.
47
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000) (proscribing unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce).
48
See Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 8, at 792 (providing details of Toysmart’s
bankruptcy); see also Toysmart.com’s Plan to Sell Consumer Data is Challenged by FTC, supra
note 44 (reporting that FTC objected to sale of customer information in light of explicit
promise to maintain customer privacy); Stephanie Stoughton, States Weigh in on Toysmart
Privacy Case, 38 Attorneys General Join Opposition to Sale of Data, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26,
2000, at C1, available at 2000 WL 3336111 (reporting involvement of attorneys general of
many states into Toysmart’s bankruptcy litigation).
49
See Stoughton, supra note 48, at C1 (pointing out that thirty-eight state attorneys
general opposed FTC’s settlement with Toysmart.com and permitting sale of its customer
list).
50
See Stipulation and Order, supra note 43 (authorizing sale of customer database as part
of company’s goodwill but only to “an entity that (1) concentrates its business in the family
commerce market, involving the areas of education, toys, learning, home and/or
instruction, including commerce, content, product and services, and (2) expressly agrees to
be Toysmart’s successor-in-interest as to the Customer Information, and expressly agrees to
[certain other] obligations.”).
51
See, e.g., Paul Davidson, Hot Commodity: Dot-Com Lists: Creditors’ Asset of Choice,
NAT’L POST, Mar. 5, 2001, at E02, available at 2001 WL 14437954 (reporting that Walt Disney
agreed to pay Toysmart $50,000 to destroy its customer list); see also Toysmart Database to Be
Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, at C7 (reporting that decision to destroy Toysmart’s
customer list effectively concluded FTC’s suit against Toysmart).
52
Diane Anderson, Wisconsin Woman Auctions Personal Info Online, June 16, 2000,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/06/16/wisconsin.info.for.sale.
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Before turning to the question of how the law should change, it is
important to map out the boundaries of existing privacy law.
II. CURRENT STATE OF AMERICAN LAW WITH RESPECT TO PERSONAL
INFORMATION
Currently, American law covering personal information is “a
patchwork of uneven, inconsistent, and often irrational” federal and
53
state rules. Most of them protect individuals from dissemination of
54
their personal information by governmental entities. The few federal
regulations that apply to the transfer of personal information in the
55
private market cover certain areas of banking and financial services,
idg/index.html (noting that DoubleClick-Abacus merger made number of web surfers
realize that, as they surf, they leave behind wealth of information).
53
FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 80 (1997).
54
See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000) (permitting individual to
determine which personal records are collected, maintained, or disseminated by federal
agencies); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2000) (providing procedural
requirements for sharing financial information among federal agencies); Privacy Protection
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2000) (protecting work products of individuals against
searches and seizures by law enforcement officers); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994,
18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000) (limiting circumstances under which drivers’ personal information
may be disclosed); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 20 U.S.C.S. § 1232(h) (Law.
Co-op. 2002) (prohibiting collection of students’ personal information by Department of
Education to be disclosed for purposes of marketing or selling); Department of
Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 2002 § 311(a), 115 Stat. 833 (2001)
(requiring that “no recipient of funds made available in this Act shall disseminate personal
information obtained by a State department of motor vehicles in connection with a motor
vehicle record”); Information Practices Act of 1977, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798 (Deering 2001)
(prohibiting “disclosure of personal information, such as employment history information,
by any state agency except under certain circumstances, including situation where
disclosure of information is relevant and necessary.”); CAL. VEH. CODE § 1808.45 (Deering
2001) (stating that right to privacy protects personal information given by individuals to
Department of Motor Vehicles); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3-23(d.1)(1) (2002) (“Personal
information of any registrant, including name, address, date of birth, or driver’s license or
social security number, shall not be furnished or transferred by or to any person”); MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 66A, § 2(c) (2002) (forbidding “any other agency or individual not
employed by the holder [from having] access to personal data” unless it is for purposes of
medical treatment, application to professional licenses, special investigation bureau, or for
detection of fraud and control); MO. REV. STAT. § 32.091(2) (2001) (prohibiting Department
of Revenue from disclosing personal information collected “without expressed consent
given by the person to whom such information pertains”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-3-101(8)
(2002) (prohibiting Montana Department of Motor Vehicles from furnishing personal
information for public inspection); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (codified
as amended at 2001 S.C. S.B. 1087 (2002)) (amending South Carolina law to prohibit
dissemination of veterans’ discharge records for commercial uses).
55
See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681 (2000) [hereinafter
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act] (recognizing individual’s right to privacy with regard to
disclosure of personal credit records); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1976, 12 U.S.C.A. §
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entertainment, cable and telecommunications, education, and postal
58
services. Adopted in response to specific violations or concerns relating
to a particular industry, these regulations are not based on any uniform
theory of rights and differ significantly in the scope of protection offered
to individuals. Scholars and privacy advocates have criticized most of
these regulations as inadequate, largely attributing their weakness to the
59
lobbying efforts of the interested industries. In addition to the federal
60
laws, many states have enacted industry-specific legislation. Like their
federal counterparts, state laws generally seek to resolve a specific set of
problems within a given industry and fail to provide coherent and

3401 (2002) (recognizing individual’s right to privacy with regard to disclosure of financial
records by banks to governmental agencies); Financial Modernization Services Act, 15
U.S.C.S. §§ 6701, 6801, 6901 (2003) (requiring that financial institutions allow customers to
“opt out,” i.e., object to disclosure of their personal information).
56
See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C.S. § 6501 (2003)
(prohibiting Internet service providers from collecting personal information from children
under the age of thirteen); Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.S. § 251 (2003)
(offering limited protection to customers’ proprietary information); Video Privacy
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2701 (2003) (recognizing privacy of video rental customer as to
specific movies bought or rented); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C.S.
§ 227 (2003) (protecting individuals’ privacy against unwanted phone solicitation); Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C.S. § 521 (2003) (recognizing cable television’s
subscriber’s privacy as to viewing habits); Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986,
18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000) (protecting individuals against interception and disclosure of wire,
oral, or electronic communications).
57
See, e.g., Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232(g)
(2002) (recognizing students’ privacy rights with respect to access and disclosure of student
records).
58
See, e.g., 39 C.F.R. § 268.2 (2003) (stating that any postal employee who violates
Private Information Act and disburses individual’s personal information shall be fined at
minimum of $1,000).
59
See Fenrich, supra note 9, at 966-67 (discussing that lobbying efforts of Direct
Marketing Association with respect to Video Privacy Protection Act resulted in weaker
privacy protection: the bill, as adopted, disallows only unauthorized disclosure of specific
titles of movies rented by customer; other personal information, including video
preferences categorized by subject matter, may be transferred without customers’ consent
as long as they had opportunity to opt out); see also MarketPlace: Interview with Jamie
Court, supra note 18 (“Corporations have so freely traded in the individual’s private
information that almost everyone’s privacy is at risk, so much so that nine out of ten people
think that corporations should obtain consent before selling an individual’s private
information, but year after year, this simple proposition has been defeated in statehouse
after statehouse by America’s biggest banks and insurers.”).
60
See PRIVACY LAWS BY STATE, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer
/states.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2003) (providing detailed information about privacyrelated topics covered by each state law); see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 6:5-6:127 (2d ed. 2000) (reviewing state statutes protecting
various forms of privacy).
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61

systematic protection of personal information.
Practically all federal and state laws that address the issue of
individual consent to collection and use of personal information apply
the “opt-out” rule, which requires companies to give individuals an
62
opportunity to opt-out of the company’s standard practices. Very few
laws are based on the more protective “opt-in” model, which obligates
companies to obtain express customer consent before they can share or
63
sell customer information.
The choice of the privacy-protection regime is critical because of
64
consumers’ tendency to stay with the default option.
Moreover,

61
See Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 222-23 (criticizing state industry-specific regulations
for their limited and ad hoc nature, including failure to address systematic protection of
privacy concerns relating to acquisition, storage, transmission, use, and disclosure of
personal information).
62
See, e.g., Angela R. Karras, The Constitutionality of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act:
A Fork in the Information Access Road, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 125, 133 (1999) (providing list of
following states that gave drivers or vehicle owners opt-out option to choose level of
confidentiality for personal information open to public: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
63
Laws requiring “opt-in” consent include the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984 and the Video Privacy Protection Act. See discussion supra note 56; see also Ann
Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 633, 665
(2000) (noting opt-in provisions of Video Privacy Protection Act); Schober et al., Colloquium
on Privacy & Security, supra note 45, at 729 (commenting that “in the United States you, in
fact, have more right to privacy in your video rental records than you do in the amount of
money you have in your financial accounts. You have more privacy in the fact that you
rent Bambi than your medical records.”).
An important recent development is a rule adopted by the FCC designed to protect
sensitive personal information of customers of telecommunications carriers. The FCC
Order provides for express customer approval for carriers’ release of customer information
to third parties, but permits opt-out consent for release of information to affiliated parties.
See Third Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
July 16, 2002, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02-214A1.pdf.
Following the FCC Order, Washington State adopted “the nation’s strongest rules
protecting telephone customer privacy.” See Washington Regulators Adopt Nation’s
Strongest Telephone Customer-Privacy Rules, at http://www.wutc.wa.gov/webdocs.nsf/6f0
baa33f074e151882566c20000604d/93d4130392518ad988256c6a0060f5a5 (Nov. 7, 2002). The
Washington rules mandate express approval for all “call detail” information, and permit
information sharing only within companies under common ownership. Id.
64
See Kent Walker, The Costs of Privacy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 116 (2001). If a
merchant chooses an “opt-out” regime in which the permission box is pre-checked and
consumers need to uncheck it to withhold permission, a large majority of consumers will
leave it checked. If the site chooses an “opt-in” regime, in which the permission box is
unchecked and consumers need to check it to give permission, a large majority of
consumers will leave it unchecked.
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companies have little incentive to facilitate the opt-out process. Privacy
advocates often describe opt-out notices as “deceptive” and buried in
65
“legalese.” Since the laws do not provide any guidelines or standards
for the opt-out mechanics, “each process is likely to include unique
hurdles, requiring consumers to muddle through a different opt-out
66
process for each firm.” Opt-out procedures are often cumbersome. For
example, many companies require their customers to first request an opt67
out form, wait for its arrival by mail, and then mail it back.
As for the common law treatment of personal information, there have
been only a few decisions, which were rather fact-specific and based on a
mix of legal theories. In all of those, the courts refused to recognize the
plaintiffs’ claims since they did not fit under the existing categories of
protected interests. Some courts have also pointed out that the
68
appropriate remedy would be creation of a statutory right.
The existing piecemeal approach brings into focus the need for
comprehensive, (not industry-specific) legislation regulating the
respective rights of individuals and commercial enterprises that collect
69
personal information. This need has become even more urgent now
due to the development of privacy laws in the international arena. In

65
Eric Roston, How to Opt Out of Database Sharing: Who’s Got your Number?, TIME, July
2, 2001, at 46.
66
Jolina C. Cuaresma, Business Law: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 497, 513 (2002) (criticizing personal data protection provisions of Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act).
67
See Kathy Kristof, Choice Words for Opting Out; Consumers Run into Trouble With
Privacy Forms, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2001, at 7N (describing opt-out procedures); see also
Robert MacMillan, Few Net Banks Offer Clear Privacy Protections, NEWSBYTES, Aug. 29, 2001,
LEXIS, General News & Information, NYSBYT (stating that Center for Democracy and
Technology has reported that less than one-third of banks offer online opt-out option and
some firms require customers to first call to request opt-out form that would be sent via
U.S. mail). Some 86% of Internet users favor an “opt-in” privacy policy and say that
Internet companies should ask people for permission to use their personal information. See
Trust and Privacy Online: Why Americans Want to Rewrite the Rules, available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/reports.asp?Report=19&Section=ReportLevel2&
Field=Level2ID&ID=37 (Aug. 20, 2000).
68
See Shibley v. Time, 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting subscriber’s
claim for unauthorized sale of subscriber lists in absence of specific right recognized by
common law and pointing out that “this is the case peculiarly within the province of a
legislative branch”).
69
Acquino, supra note 34 (quoting Sen. John McCain, Chairman of U.S. Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, saying that “[a]bsent legislation,
meaningful enforcement, and airtight coverage, online profiling will eviscerate personal
privacy.”); see also Reidenberg, supra note 16, at 898 (observing that “[a]t present, without
clear statutory rights, there is an important lack of legal accountability or liability for the
unfair treatment of personal information by the private sector.”).
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October 1998, the European Union’s Directive on Data Protection took
70
effect.
It permits transfers of personal information only to those
countries outside the European Union (“EU”) that provide an
71
“adequate” level of privacy protection.
Unsurprisingly, the United
72
States was not viewed as such a country.
The ban on transfers of personal information to the United States
jeopardized not only cross-border transactions between American and
EU companies, but also everyday operations of multinational
corporations with offices on both sides of the Atlantic. Negotiations
between the United States and the EU lasted for two years and resulted
in an agreement known as “Safe Harbor Privacy Principles,” which
73
became effective in October 2000.
The agreement allows American
companies to receive data from their EU counterparties, provided that
they either adhere to a set of privacy-protection principles embodied in
the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and publicly declare that they do so,
or develop another self-regulatory privacy-protection program that is in
74
accord with the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles.

70
See Press Release, European Union, EU Directive on Personal Data Protection Enters
Into Effect, at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/1998-4/pr89-98.htm (Oct. 23, 1998).
71
Id.
72
See Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/99 concerning the level of data
protection in the United States and the ongoing discussions between the European
Commission and the United States Government 2 (Jan. 26, 1999), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/index_en.htm (opining that “the
current patchwork of narrowly-focused sectoral laws and voluntary self-regulation cannot
at present be relied upon to provide adequate protection in all cases for personal data
transferred from the European Union.”).
73
Issuance of Principles and Transmission to European Commission: Procedures and
Start Date for Safe Harbor List, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,534 (Sept. 19, 2000); see U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, Commission Decision Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the Adequacy of Protection Provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and
Related Frequently Asked Questions, Annex I, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_
market/en/dataprot/news/shprinciples.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
74
The Safe Harbor Principles require companies to give notice to individuals before
any identifiable personal information is transferred to a third party. Individuals should
have an opportunity to object to any transfers of their personal information. If this
information is of a particularly sensitive nature (specifying medical or health conditions,
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union
membership, or the sex life of the individual), an affirmative consent of the individual is
required. Third parties acting as agents must assure at least the same level of privacy
protection as the transferring company itself. In addition, companies must protect personal
information from misuse and process it only for the purposes for which it has been
collected or authorized by the individual. Finally, the individual should have access to his
personal information and the right to correct or delete inaccurate information. See U.S.
Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_
sh_documents.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) (establishing guidelines for U.S. companies
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The Safe Harbor Privacy Principles are an important step in
establishing a data protection regime in this country. At the same time,
they are just an emergency measure designed to deal with the ultimatum
issued by the EU to the United States  either to satisfy the EU privacy
requirements or face grave economic consequences. As a permanent
solution, the “Safe Harbor” approach is much more problematic. It
requires U.S. companies to establish an internal legal regime that is at
75
odds with the current national law and market practice. The exact costs
of establishing such a regime are unclear but the strong objections to
international privacy standards from parts of the business community
76
suggest that they are high.
In addition, the “Safe Harbor” approach creates an incentive for U.S.
participants to maintain two privacy standards  the higher one for
77
European consumers and the lower one for domestic consumers.
Moreover, domestic consumers are likely to carry, at least partially, the
costs involved in satisfying the higher “Safe Harbor” requirements from
which they themselves will not be able to benefit. All these monetary
and moral costs could have been avoided had the United States itself
78
enacted adequate data privacy-protection laws.
III. CAN AMERICAN LAW PROTECT PERSONAL INFORMATION PRIVACY
WITHOUT VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION?
Most scholars agree that individuals’ loss of control over personal
79
information may lead to undesirable societal consequences. What they
disagree on is how to balance two conflicting societal interests  in
80
privacy and in the free flow of information.
The main principled
objection to expanding data privacy laws comes from defenders of free
speech who argue that granting individuals control over personal

that process personally identifying information relating to EU citizens).
75
Gellman, supra note 29 (pointing out that costs incurred by Safe Harbor participants
would have been avoided had United States enacted laws that meet international privacy
standards).
76
Id.
77
Id. (explaining that Safe Harbor solution creates “the possibility of maintaining
different privacy regimes for different customers as well as the unattractive possibility of
having lower privacy standards for American customers”).
78
Id. (arguing that “U.S. privacy laws could have avoided some costs for American
multinational companies while providing improved privacy protections for Americans”).
79
But see DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY (1998) (expressing view that privacy
is no longer option because government and corporations will always have privacyinvasive technologies and arguing in favor of “transparent” society).
80
See discussion infra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art33

BERGELSON_MACRO_-_NOVEMBER_21

2003]

11/22/2003 10:53 AM

It’s Personal But Is It Mine?

397

81

information would be unconstitutional.
These authors maintain that any transfer of information is speech.
Thus, “the right to information privacy  my right to control your
communication of personally identifiable information about me  is a
82
right to have the government stop you from speaking about me.” This
argument raises a fundamental question: even assuming there is a need
to protect personal information, can American law afford to do so
without violating the Constitution? In confronting this issue, it is
important to keep in mind that we are talking not about any speech
(newspaper publications, gossip, political debate) but only about
identifiable personal data supplied by an individual incidentally to a
business transaction.
The freedom of speech guaranteed to American citizens by the First
Amendment is one of the main characteristics of a democratic society.
Yet “from obscenity to intellectual property, from defamation to insider
trading, from the Fair Credit Reporting Act to the FDA’s mandatory
labeling requirements,” there are many different regulations that restrict
83
speech and information. One may add to this list the obligation of
confidentiality that the law imposes on lawyers, doctors, and certain
other professionals.
There may be several ways to justify restrictions on transfers of
personal data in light of the requirements of the First Amendment
jurisprudence. The most developed argument is that such transfers
amount only to “commercial speech” and thus, should enjoy limited
constitutional protection. A number of advocates on both sides of the
debate have classified the collection and exchange of personally
84
identifiable information as commercial speech.
The few courts that
85
have addressed the issue tend to agree with this classification. In U.S.

81
See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1122
(2000) [hereinafter Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy] (arguing that
“restrictions on speech that reveals personal information are constitutional under current
doctrine only if they are imposed by contract, express or implied”); see also Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 223
(1996) (criticizing argument that Constitution’s free speech guarantee must sometimes
yield to other constitutionally-protected values).
82
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy, supra note 81, at 1050-51.
83
Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 132 (2000).
84
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1373, 1409-10 (2000) (discussing theories of commercial speech and justifications for
data privacy protection).
85
See U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1999); United Reporting
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West v. FCC, the Tenth Circuit stated: “[W]hen the sole purpose of. . .
speech. . . is to facilitate the marketing of telecommunications services to
individual customers, we find the speech integral to and inseparable
from the ultimate commercial solicitation. Therefore, the speech is
86
properly categorized as commercial speech.” Practically all transfers of
personal data to the secondary market are done for the purpose of
facilitating future marketing of services to the customers who are the
subjects of that personal data. Thus, there is a strong argument in favor
of viewing these communications as commercial speech.
Regulation of commercial speech must satisfy the constitutional test
articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
87
Commission of New York.
Under that test, if the law targets a
communication that is not misleading or related to an unlawful activity,
the regulation, in order to pass constitutional muster, must: (i) be
supported by a substantial governmental interest, (ii) materially advance
that interest, and (iii) be no more restrictive than necessary to serve that
88
interest. A similar standard applies to content-neutral laws that burden
89
speech only indirectly. In other instances, the governmental interest
must be compelling and the regulation must be narrowly tailored to
90
promote that interest in the least restrictive way.
A democratic society does have a strong interest in protecting privacy
91
in personal information. If people know that they are being watched
Publ’g Corp. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d sub nom.
Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
86
See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1233.
87
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
88
See id. at 564.
89
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding that incidental
limitations of freedom of speech are permissible if essential to furtherance of substantial
governmental interest unrelated to suppression of speech).
90
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality opinion); Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
91
See Laudon, supra note 13, at 92 (observing that protection of privacy is widely
accepted value in democratic societies “without which the concept of democracy based on
individual choice makes little sense”). That was also Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s concern
when he wrote more than three decades ago:
As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the record, each
containing a number of questions. . . . There are thus hundreds of little threads
radiating from every man, millions of threads in all. If these threads were
suddenly to become visible, the whole sky would look like a spider’s web, and if
they materialized as rubber bands, buses, trams and even people would lose the
ability to move, and the wind would be unable to carry torn-up newspapers or
autumn leaves along the streets of the city.
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and their activities are recorded forever, they tend to conform their
behavior to the requirements of the observing authority, and that
92
conformism may seriously imperil the diversity and freedom of society.
Therefore, the government has at least a substantial interest in protecting
individual privacy, and a regulation that materially advances this
interest, without being more restrictive than necessary, would satisfy
constitutional requirements for a restriction on commercial speech.
Some scholars have argued that the state’s interest in protecting the
privacy of its citizens is not merely substantial but compelling because
93
the right to privacy is an important constitutional right, and protection
94
of a constitutional right is a compelling interest.
If that argument
ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD 192 (1969).
92
See, e.g., PAUL M. SCWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF
UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION 39-42 (1996) (arguing that free society depends on
individual self-determination, autonomy, and dignity which may be guaranteed only if
individuals have control over personal information); see also Edward Bloustein, Privacy as
an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964)
(“The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others and whose every
need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived
of his individuality and human dignity.”); Thomas Huff, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55
WASH. L. REV. 777, 779-81 (1980) (arguing that unauthorized disclosure of personal
information subjects individuals to fear of “presumptuous evaluation” and restricts their
liberty).
93
See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1651 (1999) (arguing that information privacy speech restrictions are needed to
promote democratic self-rule). But see Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy,
supra note 81, at 1106-10 (criticizing attempts to restrict free speech). Courts have not been
in accord as to whether there is a constitutional right to nondisclosure of personal
information. Compare Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118
F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that Supreme Court has addressed issue in recurring
dicta without resolving it, but recognizing that several circuit courts have concluded that
there is constitutional right to privacy in nondisclosure of personal information) with Doe
v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that there is no general right to
nondisclosure of private information).
94
See Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy, supra note 81, at 1106-10
(discussing “constitutional tension” argument). In addition, arguments have been made
that the government has a compelling interest in protecting people’s dignity, emotional
tranquility, and safety. See, e.g., Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76, 76
(1978) (arguing that without privacy, “intimate relationships simply could not exist”);
Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39 (1976)
(arguing that privacy is “an essential part of the complex social practice by means of which
the social group recognizes  and communicates to the individual  that his existence is
his own. And this is a precondition of personhood.”); Matthew Childs, Computer Cops
Versus the First Amendment, PLAYBOY, May 1992, at 46 (quoting Lawrence Tribe’s proposal
made at Computers, Freedom and Privacy conference to add new Amendment to United
States Constitution, reading:
This Constitution’s protections for the freedoms of speech, press, petition and
assembly, and its protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and the
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succeeds, a data privacy regulation may be able to withstand even higher
95
scrutiny than that applicable to non-commercial speech. Even if it does
not, a regulation that gives control over transfers of personal information
to the individual while recognizing both society’s legitimate interests in
hearing about matters of public concern, as well as the legitimate
interests of commercial enterprises in collecting, analyzing, and using
this information, should not be in conflict with First Amendment
requirements. As the forthcoming discussion shows, this is exactly the
96
kind of regulation advocated in this Article.
IV. WHAT LEGAL THEORY SHOULD REGULATE RIGHTS IN PERSONAL
INFORMATION?
One of the most serious obstacles to a successful legislative action is
“the absence of a coherent understanding of the nature of information
97
privacy interests.” What legal theory should underlie such legislation
and in what context should courts review competing claims? As
Raymond T. Nimmer has correctly pointed out:
In the United States, privacy is a subject of rhetoric and ideas, not
consistent or forceful legal analysis. The idea that privacy rights
exist is an accepted political and judicial principle. Most agree that
protecting personal privacy in the Information Age is a fundamental
challenge in this era. Yet the idea of privacy provides limited
98
guidance in the information age.

Privacy is a notoriously amorphous concept that has been said to
include a variety of rights held by an individual against both state and
private actors  from the right to be free from certain kinds of intrusion
99
to the right to make certain personal decisions.
The right of
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law, shall be
construed as fully applicable without regard to the technological method or
medium through which information content is generated, stored, altered,
transmitted or controlled.).
95

See, e.g., Trans Union Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 267 F.3d 1138, 1140-42 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (finding that corporation’s target marketing lists comprised speech of
purely private, personal information and denied application of strict scrutiny to those lists
because Fair Credit Reporting Act advanced public’s concern for privacy over
corporation’s speech interest).
96
See discussion infra Part VI.
97
Jonathan P. Graham, Privacy, Computers and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal
Information, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1424 (1987).
98
RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ¶ 16.02, at 16-4 (2001).
99
See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1092-126
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information privacy is a subcategory of privacy in general, and, like the
“parent” concept, it reflects the uneasy coexistence of two major
competing paradigms: “privacy as secrecy” and “privacy as control.”
Historically, privacy has been viewed as a personal right, structured
around the secrecy paradigm. This understanding takes origin in the
100
famous definition authored by Judge Thomas M. Cooley and made
101
known by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, who described privacy
102
103
as the “right to be let alone.” Under this view, the information kept
private (that is, secret) by an individual is entitled to legal protection
104
from intrusion by others.
In recent years, however, it has become
apparent that the secrecy model is unable to address information privacy
concerns arising out of the realities of a modern economy in which
individuals “routinely and daily place information concerning
themselves into the hands of others, thereby in effect disclosing that
information. Being ‘let alone’ in that setting is less relevant than being in
control of the distribution and use by others of knowledge regarding our
105
life.”
(2002) (discussing various conceptions of privacy). Solove finds six recurrent themes in the
privacy discourse:
(1) the right to be let alone  Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s famous
formulation for the right to privacy; (2) limited access to the self  the ability to
shield oneself from unwanted access by others; (3) secrecy  the concealment of
certain matters from others; (4) control over personal information  the ability to
exercise control over information about oneself; (5) personhood  the protection
of one’s personality, individuality, and dignity; and (6) intimacy  control over,
or limited access to, one’s intimate relationships or aspects of life.
Id.
100
See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1888) (declaring that person has “the
right to be let alone”).
101
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890) (discussing various notions of privacy and privacy rights).
102
Id.
103
See NIMMER, supra note 98, ¶ 16.02[1], at 16-5 (“The idea of a right to be let alone
suggests a legal right to be free from intrusion by others into the sphere of protected or
secret information concerning the person.”); see also Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:
Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1431 (2001)
(“It was out of this paradigm that the Big Brother metaphor emerged. Under the paradigm,
privacy is about concealment, and it is invaded by watching and by public disclosure of
confidential information.”).
104
This theory has traditionally helped define the boundaries of an individual’s claim
to privacy in the area of constitutional law. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967) (holding that no Fourth Amendment protection exists for information knowingly
exposed to public, but that Fourth Amendment protects information that individual seeks
to preserve in private).
105
NIMMER, supra note 98, ¶ 16.02[1], at 16-5 (“The idea of a right to be let alone
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Conversely, the privacy-as-control model has gained significant
106
academic support in recent years.
This model treats information
privacy as a form of power, the “claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
107
information about them is communicated to others.”
The control
paradigm implements the liberal autonomy principle by seeking to place
the individual at the center of decision-making about personal
108
information use.
In many respects, it is a property paradigm: it
presumes that an individual has a qualified right to exclude others from
accessing his personal information as well as a similarly qualified right
to determine the terms on which this information may become available
to others.
109
The control paradigm has been criticized by some scholars for
underestimating the socio-political value of privacy and the role of the
110
government in shaping and enforcing this value.
Placing reliance
entirely on individual control and industry self-regulation, without
further legislative or enforcement action, may, in fact, lead to further
erosion of privacy. The control model, however, does not necessitate
that. It is quite possible to combine that model with governmental
supervision. Moreover, it is possible to allocate control so that
competing interests and values of different societal groups are taken into
account. Individuals’ control in that case would not be absolute, just like
the privacy interest is never absolute in a society; nevertheless,
implementing the control model would provide a realistic and fair
mechanism for the protection of that interest.
The two paradigms  “privacy as secrecy” and “privacy as control”
 are reflected in attempts to define individual rights with respect to
personal information through either torts or property. From the
perspective of torts, an individual’s right to personal information is an
suggests a legal right to be free from intrusion by others into the sphere of protected or
secret information concerning the person.”).
106
Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000)
(observing that the “leading paradigm on the Internet and in the real, or off-line world,
conceives of privacy as a personal right to control the use of one’s data”).
107
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
108
See Schwartz, supra note 106, at 820.
109
Anita L. Allen, Privacy-as-Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the
Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 865 (2000) (pointing out that “[w]hile some of the theorists
who reject the control-emphatic definition have done so as part of an effort to supplant
liberalism, even liberals have rejected control-based definitions of privacy”).
110
See id. at 868 (arguing that control over personal data is neither necessary nor
sufficient to protect privacy); Schwartz, supra note 106, at 818-34 (criticizing “bottom-up”
privacy-control model).
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extension of traditionally understood privacy, a personal right that may
not be unreasonably infringed upon. The role of the court in such a case
is to determine what kind of infringement amounts to a violation of the
individual’s privacy.
From the property perspective, personal
information is not a personal right but rather a good, and the court’s job
is to determine who has a prior claim to that good and how to regulate
any coexisting and competing claims.
A. Current Treatment of Personal Information Under the Property and Tort
Regimes
1. Current Treatment of Personal Information Under the Property
Regime
Currently, neither property nor torts theory recognizes individuals’
rights in their information. At the heart of that nonrecognition is a view
that personal information is no ones until collected, a view similar to the
111
“wild animals’ theory” set forth in Pierson v. Post. In that famous early
American case, the court concluded that wild animals in the state of
nature are not owned by anyone until captured, and that whoever
captures the animal first has the prior claim to it. Today, courts view
personal information in a similar fashion. Even though they often
acknowledge that personal information has become a valuable
commodity, they believe that it belongs to no one until collected.
112
Accordingly, it can only be the property of a collector.
This belief stands behind the decision in Moore v. Regents of the
113
University of California in which the court denied the plaintiff property
rights in his body and his biological information. This belief is even
114
more explicit in a few cases in which plaintiffs made unsuccessful
attempts to block unauthorized dissemination of personal information
115
based on the theory of misappropriation of an individual’s name. The
courts rejected these claims, stating, inter alia, that individuals do not
111

3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
Theoretically, individuals can compile and sell their personal data. See Wisconsin
Woman Auctions Personal Info Online, supra note 52 (reporting story of Tracy Coyle, who
prepared detailed docket of data about herself and announced that she would auction it to
highest bidder). So far, however, this example appears to be unique.
113
51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990).
114
See, e.g., Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); U.S. News &
World Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No. 95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518, at *1 (Va. Cir. June
13, 1996); Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
115
See discussion infra notes 159-81 and accompanying text.
112
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116

have property rights in the names they use.
117
118
Both federal and most states’ laws punish identity theft. But
despite the name of the offense, what these laws really aim at is future
crime (e.g., theft, fraud) the commission of which is facilitated by
119
identity theft.
Unless there is intent to commit that future crime, an
unlawful use or transfer of identifying information does not constitute a
theft of identity.
And yet, courts have consistently recognized the property rights of
business enterprises in their customer lists under both state and federal
laws, including laws on secured transactions, bankruptcy, and
120
taxation.
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code covers security
121
interests in personal property, and various state courts have held that
122
customer lists are general intangibles, a subset of personal property.
Similarly, the Internal Revenue Code considers customer lists to be
123
intangible property.
Bankruptcy cases view customer lists as part of
124
the debtor’s estate, which is itself comprised of property.

116

Avrahami, No. 95-1318, slip op. at *16.
See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (“Identity Theft Act”), 918 U.S.C.
1028, amended by Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (1998).
118
See http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/federallaws.html#statelaws (providing list
of states that have passed laws related to identity theft) (last revised Sept. 30, 2003).
119
See, e.g., Identity Theft Act, supra note 117, ¶ 003 (making it illegal for someone to
“knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another
person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a
violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local
law”); cf. American Law Institute Model Penal Code Official Draft § 232(2) (1962) (“A
person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully transfers immovable property of another or any
interest therein with purpose to benefit himself or another not entitled thereto.”).
120
Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 8, at 788 (noting that various sets of laws, including
laws on secured transactions and bankruptcy, have reinforced “property-like” nature of
customer lists).
121
See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (2000) (revised) (“This article applies to: (1) a transaction. . .
that creates a security interest in personal property”).
122
See, e.g., In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that
valid grant of security interest in general intangibles covered company’s customer lists); see
also John C. Minahan, Jr. & Bryan G. Handlos, Scope of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 390 PLI/PAT 205, 212 (1986) (“Property such as customer lists. . . have been held to be
general intangibles, obtaining an interest in which is subject to Article 9.”); Dan L.
Nicewander, General Intangibles Under Revised Article 9, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 169,
170 (2000) (comparing former and revised versions of Article 9 and concluding that, despite
more narrow scope of definition of “general intangibles” in revised Article 9, customer lists
remain within its scope).
123
See Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 8, at 789 n.6 (noting that § 936(h)(3)(B)(v) of
Internal Revenue Code defines “intangible property” to include customer lists).
124
See, e.g., In re El Paso Refinery, L.P., 196 B.R. 58, 70-71 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) (citing
foreclosure order naming customer lists among general intangibles); In re Collated Prods.
117
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2. Current Treatment of Personal Information Under the Tort Regime
In the torts area, American courts recognize several privacy-related
causes of action. Pursuant to the authoritative classification of Dean
125
126
Prosser, they are usually unified into four groups  false light,
127
128
intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of embarrassing facts,
129
and the appropriation of name or likeness. Out of those, the last three
could provide a basis for recovery for an unauthorized acquisition or
130
transfer of personal information.
All three theories, however, have
been tested and rejected by courts in that context.

Corp., 121 B.R. 195, 197 (Bankr. D. Del. 1990) (including customer lists in general intangible
assets owned by corporation), aff’d, Collated Prods. Corp. v. United Jersey Bank Cent.,
N.A., 937 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 8, at 790
(concluding that customer lists are “almost certain ‘property’ within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code”).
125
See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) (exploring theory
of privacy and four privacy torts).
126
Id. at 398. The false light tort protects the individual’s right to be secure from
publicity that places a person in a “false light before the public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
127
The intrusion tort protects the individual against intentional intrusion “upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652B (1977).
128
Prosser, supra note 125, at 392. This tort protects the individual against giving of
“publicity to a matter concerning the [individual’s] private life” where such matter is not of
legitimate concern to the public, and the nature of the disclosure would be “highly
offensive” to a reasonable person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
129
Prosser, supra note 125, at 389. This tort protects the individual against the
appropriation of his name or likeness for the use or benefit of another. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
130
The false light tort is unlikely to apply to unauthorized dissemination of personal
information because, under that tort, the information has to be false or erroneous. Personal
information transferred by primary collectors into the secondary market usually has been
provided by individuals themselves and is, in most instances, true and correct. An
argument may be made that a certain “profile” that is the subject matter of a transfer may
put an individual in a false light just by virtue of being limited and/or one-sided. This
argument is unlikely to succeed because no information is “complete;” therefore, it could
lead to a rule where no information may be transferred at all. Even if such a rule is to be
made, it should be made on a theory other than “false light.” This tort nonetheless may
have a limited application to protect an individual against dissemination of erroneous
information in situations when the information was not provided by the individual and
when the defendant has not taken proper steps to ensure its correctness. See, e.g., Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (allowing suit against credit
bureau for incorrect credit report disseminated to third parties).
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a. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
Invasion of privacy by “intrusion” occurs when a person intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, into the solitude or seclusion, or
private affairs or concerns, of another in a manner that is highly
131
offensive to a reasonable person.
In the context of personal
information, the utility of this tort is rather limited because it may apply
132
only to unlawful collection of data, not to its use or disclosure. Courts
generally require plaintiffs to establish the following four elements: (i)
an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff’s seclusion; (ii)
which is offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (iii) as to a
matter which is private; and (iv) which has caused anguish and
133
suffering.
The intrusion does not have to be of a physically defined place  it
134
can be of one’s “personality” or “psychological integrity.”
Based on
that theory, a group of American Express cardholders filed a class action
against American Express companies for their practice of renting
135
information regarding cardholder-spending habits.
The practice
included categorizing and ranking cardholders into tiers based on their
spending record, and then renting this information to participating
136
merchants.
In order to draw spending profiles, American Express
analysts considered where their cardholders shopped and how much
they spent, as well as their behavioral characteristics and spending
137
histories. Plaintiffs argued that, because American Express rented lists
based on this compiled information, such practice involved the
disclosure of private financial information and resembled cases
involving intrusion into private financial dealings, such as bank account
138
transactions.

131

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
See Fenrich, supra note 9, at 972 n.150 (pointing out that tort of intrusion may be
relevant to data collection rather than dissemination); see also Reidenberg, supra note 3, at
222-23 (noting that intrusion tort does not address such data protection practices as storage,
use, or disclosure of personal information).
133
See PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1279 (Nev. 1995); Davis v. Temple,
673 N.E.2d 737, 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 904 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (listing elements of tort of intrusion)...
134
See Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983) (“One’s
emotional sanctum is certainly due the same expectations of privacy as one’s physical
environment.”).
135
Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1352-53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
136
Id. at 1353.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 1354.
132
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The court rejected the claim of intrusion, stating that the plaintiffs
failed to establish the first element of the tort  an unauthorized
intrusion or prying into the plaintiffs’ seclusion: “[b]y using the
American Express card, a cardholder is voluntarily, and necessarily,
giving information to defendants that, if analyzed, will reveal a
139
cardholder’s spending habits and shopping preferences.”
Therefore,
the court concluded, American Express did not commit unauthorized
intrusion upon cardholders’ seclusion by merely compiling and renting
140
information voluntarily given to it.
In a recent case, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire added a twist
141
to this analysis. In Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., the court had to decide
whether an investigator may be held liable for obtaining a person’s social
security number from a credit reporting agency without her knowledge
or consent, as well as for obtaining her work address by making a
142
pretextual phone call.
The Remsburg court differentiated between
information that may be reasonably expected to remain private even
after it was disclosed by the plaintiff to a third party (social security
number) and information that is not so “secret, secluded or private”
143
(work address). It concluded that only in the first case may a plaintiff
maintain a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion, and only if the
plaintiff can prove that such intrusion would be offensive to a person of
144
ordinary sensibilities.
In determining whether the intrusion was
sufficiently offensive, the fact finder was to consider “the degree of
intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the
intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into
which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is
145
invaded.”
These two cases reveal why the tort of intrusion upon seclusion cannot
serve as a mechanism for regulating rights in personal information in
general. The intrusion upon seclusion tort protects only “secret”
information, i.e., the information that either has never been
communicated to anyone (Dwyer) or is highly personal in its character

139

Id.
Id.
141
Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
142
Id. at 1004-05.
143
Fischer v. Hooper, 732 A.2d 396, 400 (N.H. 1999) (quoting Hamberger v. Eastman,
106 N.H. 107, 110 (1964)).
144
Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1008-09.
145
Id. (quoting Bauer v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1109 (D. Minn.
2001)).
140
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(Remsburg). Since the problem of unauthorized transfers of personal
information involves information of various degrees of secrecy, disclosed
by individuals sometimes more, sometimes less consciously, this tort is
unable to provide a comprehensive solution.
b. Disclosure of Private Facts
The disclosure tort is triggered by public disclosure of private facts in
146
which the disclosure is highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Several requirements, however, limit the availability of this tort. One
limitation is that the information must be communicated to a sufficient
number of people, so that it is “substantially certain to become. . . public
147
knowledge.”
It is a matter of degree as to how many persons must
have seen or heard the information to constitute the “public” but, under
the prevalent standard, it is unlikely that a sale of personal information
by a primary collector to a secondary collector would meet the
148
requirement of publicity.
Another limitation imposed on this cause of action is that the disclosed
information must be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person
149
of ordinary sensibilities.
Courts have proclaimed that the disclosure
tort “is not intended for the protection of any shrinking soul who is
150
abnormally sensitive about such publicity.” The more personal the
information disclosed, the greater the intrusion upon an individual’s

146

See Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977); see also Tureen v. Equifax,
Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 419 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that disclosure of health record by consumer
credit reporting firm to insurance firm client does not rise to level of “publication”);
Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 615 F. Supp. 299, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1985), rev’d on other
grounds, 795 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that circulation of investigative report in
personal injury suit to “only a very small group of persons” does not satisfy publicity
requirement); Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that disclosure by University to State Scholarship and Loan Commission of
student’s grades is not communication “to the public in general or to a large number of
persons”); Robins v. Conseco Fin. Loan Co., 656 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that disclosure of applicant’s negative credit information by lender to applicant’s
fellow employee is not public disclosure even if fellow employee repeated information to
others); Childs v. Williams, 825 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that letter from
physician to patient’s employer was not public disclosure where letter was available only
to small group of supervisors).
148
See MCCARTHY, supra note 60, § 5:80 (discussing publicity requirement).
149
See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 811 (4th ed. 1987).
150
Prosser, supra note 125, at 397; see also Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 723 (Cal.
1980) (“[s]ome person with extra sensitive perception. . . cannot compel this court to
establish liability at so low a threshold.”).
147
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151

privacy. The disclosure of merely neutral facts  of the kind that once
prompted Warren and Brandeis to write their famous article  was held
152
not actionable.

151
See Bratt v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 785 F.2d 352, 360 (1st Cir. 1986); see also
MCCARTHY, supra note 60, § 6:9 (listing cases involving disclosure of private facts).
Examples of cases in which courts found a disclosure to be highly offensive to a reasonable
person include: Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding it
offensive to disclose diary of deceased spouse, which revealed private thoughts regarding
marriage and surviving spouse); Susan S. v. Israels, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42, 47 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997) (holding that defendant’s unauthorized reading and dissemination of plaintiff’s
mental health records constituted serious invasion of privacy); Urbaniak v. Newton, 277
Cal. Rptr. 354, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that disclosure of HIV positive status is
invasion of privacy right and offensive to reasonable person); Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc.,
972 P.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s argument that plaintiff
had no privacy interest in blood sample); Green v. Chicago Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996) (finding that newspaper’s public disclosure of mother’s spoken farewell to
dead son over body in hospital room after he had been shot to death may constitute
invasion of privacy); Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(reversing dismissal of plaintiff’s claim because employer’s disclosure of mastectomy may
be invasion of privacy); Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 829-30 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
(deciding that anti-abortion protestor’s public disclosure of plaintiff’s name and future
plans for abortion on poster may be invasion of privacy); Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378,
382 (Miss. 1990) (affirming district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendant despite
plaintiff’s legal right in keeping hysterectomy private); Mason v. Williams Disc. Ctr., Inc.,
639 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (concluding that plaintiff had actionable claim
against local store for posting sign implying that plaintiff wrote bad checks); Hillman v.
Columbia County, 474 N.W.2d 913, 920 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (finding potential violation of
constitutional right to privacy in prison’s disclosure of inmate’s HIV status to fellow
inmates).
152
Examples of situations in which courts have found that a reasonable person would
not be highly offended by the disclosure of neutral information include: Howell by Goerdt
v. Tribune Entm’t, 106 F.3d 215, 220-21 (7th Cir. 1997) (airing television show in which
plaintiff was depicted as rowdy teenager is not invasion of privacy); Wood v. Nat’l
Computer Sys., Inc., 814 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that defendant’s inadvertent
revelation of plaintiff’s passing test score to one person is not highly objectionable); Lodge
v. Shell Oil Co., 747 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that termination from employment
is not private fact); Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182,
1191 (D. Ariz. 1998) (broadcasting undercover investigation of plaintiff’s medical lab was
not highly offensive); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Nat’l Catholic Reporter Publ’n Co., 978 F.
Supp. 1195, 1200 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (disclosing person’s religious affiliation is not
defamatory); Galdauckas v. Interstate Hotels Corp., 901 F. Supp. 454, 470 (D. Mass. 1995)
(writing plaintiff’s age on birthday card circulated to fellow employees is not invasion of
privacy); Grunseth v. Marriott Corp., 872 F. Supp. 1069, 1075-76 (D.D.C. 1995) (staying
overnight in a certain hotel is not grounds for invasion of privacy suit); Wolf v. Regardie,
553 A.2d 1213, 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (publishing article about plaintiff’s wealth is not
private matter highly offensive to reasonable person); Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters Local 1264
v. Mun. of Anchorage, 973 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Alaska 1999) (holding that municipal
employees do not have legitimate expectation of privacy in their salaries); Dwyer v. Am.
Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (selling plaintiff’s credit card
information is not unauthorized intrusion); Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, 452 A.2d
689, 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (affirming motion for summary judgment because
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In most instances the lifestyle information that is the subject of
commercial transfers does not reach the level of “highly personal and
153
Combined with the fact that a transfer of personal
embarrassing.”
information from the primary collector to the secondary market is
unlikely to be viewed as public disclosure, that more or less disqualifies
this tort as a possible cause of action for plaintiffs attempting to control
the use and transfer of their personal information.
c. Invasion of Privacy by Appropriation and the Right of Publicity
154

The appropriation tort, as well as the related right of publicity,
consists of the appropriation of the plaintiff’s name, picture, or likeness
155
for the defendant’s benefit or advantage.
Classic examples that give
rise to both torts include unauthorized use of an individual’s name or
156
picture to advertise the defendant’s product, to add luster to the name
157
158
of a corporation, or for other business purposes.
The appropriation
tort or the right of publicity is recognized virtually in every state through
159
either statutory or common law, the difference between the two often
disclosure that plaintiff bought expensive house is not invasion of privacy); Johnson v.
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (sustaining
defendant’s demurrer because revealing that plaintiff found and returned large sum of
money was laudatory and not invasion of privacy).
153
See, e.g., King County v. Sheehan, 57 P.3d 307, 316 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (opining
that state statute based on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS would not protect names of
county police officers from disclosure because statute “only applies to personal information
that employees would not normally share with strangers”); Webb v. City of Shreveport, 371
So. 2d 316, 319 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that people have no reasonable expectations of
privacy as to their identity or as to where they live or work).
154
The difference between the appropriation tort and the right of publicity stems not
from the actions of the defendant but rather from “the nature of the plaintiff’s rights and
the nature of the resulting injury. [W]hile the appropriation branch of the right of privacy
is invaded by an injury to the psyche, the right of publicity is infringed by an injury to the
pocketbook.” Prosser, supra note 125, at 402.
155
See Prosser, supra note 125, at 401.
156
See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (recognizing, for
first time, individual’s rights in identity, this case involved artist whose picture was used
by insurance company to promote life insurance).
157
See, e.g., Cordell v. Detective Publ’n Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Tenn. 1968) (involving
claim of invasion of privacy by appropriation to add luster to corporation’s name when
defendant company published story about murder of plaintiff-mother’s daughter);
Martinez v. Democrat-Herald Publ’g Co., 669 P.2d 818 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
defendant’s portrayal of plaintiff as drug user in photograph published in newspaper did
not constitute appropriation).
158
MCCARTHY, supra note 60, § 5:61.
159
See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 851-54 (W. Page Keeton ed.,
4th ed. 1987) (discussing appropriation tort and protection of one’s name, image, or
likeness under statutory law in states such as New York).
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160

being ignored.
In recent years, plaintiffs in three different state court cases (Shibley v.
161
162
Time, Inc., Dwyer v. American Express Co., and U.S. News and World
163
Report v. Avrahami ) attempted to apply some form of the appropriation
tort to enjoin unauthorized dissemination of personal information
164
through the sale of mailing lists. All those attempts have failed.
In Shibley, a class action against Time Magazine, Esquire, Playboy, Ladies
Home Journal, and the issuer of American Express credit cards, the court
rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants’ practice of selling
subscription lists to direct-mail advertisers without the prior consent of
165
subscribers amounted to an “appropriation of one’s personality.” The
court opined that the “appropriation or exploitation of one’s personality”
recognized by Ohio law may be invoked only in “those situations where
the plaintiff’s name or likeness is displayed to the public to indicate that
166
the plaintiff endorses the defendant’s product or business.”
The
Shibley court rejected plaintiffs’ claim as a matter of either privacy or
property right.

160
In this paper, the “right of publicity” and the “tort of appropriation” are often used
interchangeably.
161
Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
162
Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
163
U.S. News & World Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No. 95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518,
at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996).
164
Another case that deals with unauthorized commercial dissemination of personal
information has yet to reach trial. In Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS
439 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1999); certification. of class action aff’d sub nom. Weld v. Glaxo
Wellcome, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 2001), a group of customers sued a pharmacy for
sharing customer prescription information with certain drug manufacturers. The court
rejected the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, acknowledging that, as a matter of
law, CVS’s marketing activities with drug manufacturers could amount to a violation of
customers’ privacy as well as to a “sale of the plaintiffs’ names, addresses and personal
prescription information, from which the defendants profited.” Id. at *20. The court
opined that although Massachusetts did not expressly recognize a separate cause of action
for tortious misappropriation of private information, and although that claim was probably
preempted by a state statute prohibiting the use of an individual’s name for “the purposes
of trade without his written consent,” the plaintiffs should still be allowed to proceed with
their claim. Id. at *21 n.19. The court concluded that the “facts alleged by plaintiffs, (i.e. the
use of plaintiffs’ private information for the defendants’ financial gain), falls [sic] within the
scope of [the appropriation] cause of action.” Id. at *22. That conclusion does not by itself
imply that the court views personal information as the property of the plaintiffs, but it does
not preclude such interpretation either.
165
Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 339.
166
Id.
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167

In Dwyer, the court used the same argument to deny relief to a group
of American Express cardholders who claimed that American Express’s
practice of selling their spending profiles to participating merchants
amounted to the appropriation of cardholders’ names and perceived
168
lifestyles. The court opined that “an individual name has value only
169
and that
when it is associated with one of defendants’ lists”
“[d]efendants create value by categorizing and aggregating these
170
names.”
Implicit in that conclusion was the court’s view that, to the
extent personal information may be viewed as property, that property
belongs to the one who collects it.
The arguments in Avrahami resemble those made in Shibley and Dwyer.
In that case, an individual plaintiff sued U.S. News & World Report for
renting out his name (or rather one of the names he used) as a part of its
subscriber lists. The appellate court of Virginia rejected the plaintiff’s
claim, stating that the tort of appropriation is intended only to give
redress to a person whose name, portrait, or picture was used for
171
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade. The inclusion of an
individual name in a mailing list did not constitute a use for either
172
advertising or trade, as defined by Virginia statute.
Moreover, the
court stated that Mr. Avrahami had no property rights in the names he
used, therefore U.S. News neither violated the statute nor committed
common law conversion by including his name as part of a mailing list
173
exchange.
It is not quite clear how broadly the Avrahami opinion should be read.
On the one hand, the language of the opinion is rather sweeping 
174
individuals have no property right in the names they use. On the other
hand, that broad language may be qualified by the fact that the name in
question was not Mr. Avrahami’s true name, i.e., arguably, it was not
really a part of his personality. The court repeatedly emphasized the fact
that Mr. Avrahami had used “nineteen names. . . in the past five

167
Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1355 (holding that tort of appropriation is inapplicable because
it only protects “a person from having his name or image used for commercial purposes
without consent”).
168
See id. at 1356.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
U.S. News & World Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No. 95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518,
at *16 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996).
172
See id.
173
Id.
174
Id.

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art33

BERGELSON_MACRO_-_NOVEMBER_21

2003]

11/22/2003 10:53 AM

It’s Personal But Is It Mine?
175

413
176

years,”
that he “had intentionally used a false name”
and
177
“affirmatively created this litigation by using a false name.” Finally, it
is possible that the court may believe that individuals have property
rights in their name (or true name), but that the practice of selling or
renting mailing lists does not give rise to either a statutory appropriation
or a common law conversion because such practice does not constitute
exercise of dominion or control of such magnitude as to deprive a person
178
of possession of his name.
Or, using the words of the opinion, such
practice does not “invade any property right [an individual] may have in
179
his name.”
Finally, the most recent unsuccessful attempt to the appropriation
180
theory for protection of personal information is Remsburg, a case
concerning a woman killed by a stalker who acted on the information
supplied by a private investigator. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
did not allow a misappropriation claim against the investigator,
explaining that the tort “does not protect one’s name per se; rather it
181
protects the value associated with that name.”
There is no cause of
action if a person’s name was published for purposes other than taking
advantage of the “reputation, prestige or other value” associated with
182
the person. In this case, the investigator capitalized not on the victim’s
183
reputation or prestige but rather on his client’s willingness to pay.
Accordingly, the court held that “a person whose personal information is
sold does not have a cause of action for appropriation against the
184
investigator who sold the information.”

175

Id. at *4, *15.
Id. at *14.
177
Id. at *18. The court viewed with skepticism Mr. Avrahami’s motives for
commencing the litigation, which appeared to be a public relations campaign. Mr.
Avrahami had made a statement that “one of the primary reasons he filed suit was that the
notoriety would help him meet ‘chicks.’” Id. at *15. Later, Mr. Avrahami wrote a letter to
the Direct Marketing Association (the “DMA”), proposing a mechanism for handling
personal information that requires explicit consent of consumers. For the text of the letter
see http://www.epic.org/privacy/junk_mail/DMAletter.html (June 24, 1996). The DMA
president has rejected the suggestion. For the text of the reply, see http://www.epic.org
/privacy/junk_mail/DMAresponse.html (July 15, 1996).
178
See Avrahami, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518, at *18.
179
Id. (emphasis added).
180
Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
181
Id. at 1009 (quoting Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994)).
182
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. d at 382-83 (1977)).
183
Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1010.
184
Id. The Remsburg court nevertheless concluded that the defendant may be held
liable under the general negligence theory. It held:
176
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The lesson of the outlined opinions is quite uniform: courts are
reluctant to expand the scope of the appropriation tort beyond
advertising and related purposes. Although courts admit that personal
information compiled by collectors is property, they deny that it was
property before it was collected. It is easy to see a flaw in the logic of the
courts: not only do they equate property with monetary value (which is
not always the case  my drawings may have no monetary value but
they are still my property), but even when individual personal
information has a price tag attached (Remsburg), they still refuse to
enforce the plaintiff’s right to it. Thus, in their current form, none of the
privacy-related torts are conceptually suited to protect an individual’s
personal information.
B. Property or Torts?
As the preceding discussion shows, the current law recognizes neither
personal nor property rights of individuals in personal information.
That conceptual lacuna makes the choice of an appropriate legal theory
particularly important. In this section, I argue in favor of the property
regime as opposed to the tort regime, for the following three reasons: (i)
the torts approach cannot support a consistent, workable mechanism for
the enforcement of information privacy rights; (ii) U.S. law, explicitly or
implicitly, already regards personal information as property; and (iii) the
property regime better serves the interests of individual parties and
society in general.
Several scholars have argued that individual privacy with respect to
personal information should be protected through the expansion of
185
186
either the disclosure tort or the appropriation tort.
These proposals

The threats posed by stalking and identity theft lead us to conclude that the risk
of criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so that an investigator has a
duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third person’s personal
information to a client. . . . This is especially true when, as in this case, the
investigator does not know the client or the client’s purpose in seeking the
information.
Id. at 1008.
185
See Flavio L. Komuves, We’ve Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation and
Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 574 (1998) (arguing that courts should “take affirmative steps to
prohibit [social security number] and name dissemination” by expanding use of disclosure
and appropriation torts); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1283, 1312 (2000) (arguing in favor of tort regime over property regime because it
“avoids the trap of alienability the perverse incentives that a market in alienable personal
data would create.”).
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may mitigate some of the current problems but would leave most
significant issues unresolved.
As for the disclosure tort, it protects only information that is kept
secret. The secrecy model of privacy, however, is not able to address
many of the vital personal interests involved in the modern information
187
economy.
Specifically, that model fails to take into account that in
today’s world “individuals are encompassed within a web of
188
information about what they do, and when and why.”
Most of that
information is voluntarily disclosed by individuals, and therefore is not
eligible for protection under the disclosure tort.
Another problem with the tort of disclosure is that, even if the
boundaries of protected information were expanded, courts would still
have to measure alleged violations against a reasonable expectation of
privacy. That raises both moral and practical concerns because what is
reasonably private varies dramatically across different social, economic,
189
and cultural groups. Someone who lives in a mansion would probably
have different expectations of privacy than someone who lives on the
street. Unless we, as a society, are prepared to treat individuals in
different socio-economic groups differently, we cannot accept this
approach. In addition, as concerns surrounding transfer of personal
information become increasingly international in scope, what is or is not
reasonable will depend on the standard adopted in each particular
190
jurisdiction. For instance, as has been already suggested, American
companies trying to qualify for the “Safe Harbor” may end up adopting
two different standards  the higher one for European customers and
the lower one for domestic customers.
Making “reasonable expectations of privacy” a cornerstone of a
regulatory structure is problematic even on the most basic theoretical

186
See Fenrich, supra note 9, at 994-1003 (arguing that courts should apply either
appropriation tort or right of publicity to protect individuals from unwanted commercial
use of their personal information); see also Mary Jo Obee & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Privacy in
the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1011, 1027 (2000)
(discussing that various torts, including tort of appropriation, “provide the basis for causes
of action for violation of information privacy,” noted in Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in
Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1159
(1997)).
187
See discussion supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
188
NIMMER, supra note 98, at 16-5.
189
Cf. Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 125 n.18 (2002) (noting, in context
of Fourth Amendment inquiry, that “reasonable expectations of privacy” are formed by
individual’s political and cultural background).
190
See discussion supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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level because the question begs the answer  what expectations are
reasonable depends on the existing practice, which in turn depends on
the allocation of legal entitlements. At this point, the balance of rights is
so heavily tilted in favor of collectors, that it is probably unreasonable to
expect that our personal information will not be abused.
The proposal to expand the appropriation tort does not create a
comprehensive solution to the problem either. Both courts and scholars
have pointed out that the tort of appropriation differs from other
privacy-based torts in that, unlike the other three torts that safeguard the
191
personal rights of an individual, this tort is proprietary in nature, it
protects “a right of value upon which the plaintiff [should be able to]
192
capitalize by selling licenses.”
Expanding the appropriation tort to cover personal information would
mean implicitly recognizing the proprietary nature of such
193
information.
But why should a proprietary interest be regulated
entirely through torts? Torts give individuals only negative rights by
protecting recognized interests of individuals from infringement by
others. Why shouldn’t the owner of personal information have
affirmative rights as well, including the right to alienate it like any other
property? The question is particularly salient in the American legal
system, which disfavors restrictions on free alienation of property.
The appropriation tort is, in essence, a form of the tort of conversion
that
protects
an
individual’s
proprietary
interest
from
194
misappropriation.
No one suggests, however, that claims of
individuals with respect to real or personal property should be regulated
entirely through the tort of conversion. In other words, the tort theory
can help to regulate some incidents of ownership; but where proprietary
interests are involved, it plays only a secondary role compared to the
property regime.

191
See Prosser, supra note 125, at 406 (“It seems sufficiently evident that appropriation
tort is quite a different matter from intrusion, disclosure of private facts, or a false light in
the public eye. The interest protected is not so much a mental as a proprietary one, in the
exclusive use of the plaintiff’s name and likeness as an aspect of his identity.”).
192
Id.
193
In fact, in many areas of the law, personal information is already viewed as
property, just not the property of an individual. See discussion supra notes 118-22 and
accompanying text.
194
“Conversion” is defined as the wrongful possession or disposition of another’s
property as if it were one’s own; an act or series of acts of willful interference, without
lawful justification, with a chattel in a manner inconsistent with another’s right, whereby
that other person is deprived of the use and possession of the chattel. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 333 (7th ed. 1999).
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On a more abstract level, the choice between the tort regime and the
property regime for the protection of personal information means the
choice between property rules and liability rules as defined in the
195
seminal article authored by Calabresi and Melamed.
According to
their theory, an “entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent
that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder
must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the
196
entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.” The liability rule protects an
entitlement in the sense that holders must be compensated whenever the
entitlement is taken away from them without their consent, the value of
the entitlement being “determined by some organ of the state rather than
197
by the parties themselves.”
A society chooses which rule to employ in relation to a particular
entitlement based on a variety of considerations. For Calabresi and
Melamed, the main reason to choose one rule over another is efficiency,
although the authors recognize that other reasons, such as distributional
198
goals and avoiding moral harm to the individual or the society at
199
large, are also valid considerations. The property rule requires the
least amount of state intervention since the value of an entitlement is
200
determined by two willing participants in a voluntary transaction.
Therefore, unless there are special circumstances, the property rule is the
most efficient. The liability rule may be preferred where a “market
valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient,” i.e., “either
201
unavailable or too expensive compared to a collective valuation,” or
where it “facilitates a combination of efficiency and distributive results
202
which would be difficult to achieve under a property rule.”
From the utilitarian perspective, it may appear more efficient to value
personal information objectively, thus avoiding the costs of negotiations
with each particular individual. The preference for the liability rule,
however, would mean that individual entitlements to personal
information recognized under tort law would have to be enforced

195
See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing different
entitlement regimes in society).
196
Id. at 1092.
197
Id.
198
See id. at 1110.
199
Id. at 1112-13 (discussing external costs in constructing rules of alienability).
200
See id. at 1092.
201
Id. at 1110.
202
Id.
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exclusively by litigation, on a case-by-case basis, which would involve
considerable expenditures of funds and time, both by litigants and the
judicial system. Moreover, in order to recover, the plaintiff will have to
prove actual damages, which most likely will be trivial. That by itself
will discourage people from bringing lawsuits against those who violate
their rights in personal information, thereby making the rule inefficient.
The choice of the liability regime is even less persuasive if utility is not
limited to efficiency but instead is understood, in Mill’s words, as “utility
in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a
203
progressive being.”
By that, Mill spoke to everyone’s right of free
204
choice, which may be curtailed only to prevent “harm to others.”
In
light of this understood utility, a society may be justified in interfering
with a voluntary transfer of personal information between an individual
and a collector only if the society can show that allowing a free exchange
would hurt someone else or the public in general.
Arguments have been made that the property regime may hurt the
205
public in general: if collectors are forced to negotiate with individuals
for the sale of personal information, transaction costs would rise and the
scope of personal information available to various industries would
206
decrease.
Even assuming arguendo that a certain decrease does
207
follow, it is far from clear that it would noticeably hurt the public.
Most probably, under Mill’s theory, it would be one of those
“constructive injur[ies] which a person causes to society, by conduct
which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions
perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself [and] which
society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human
208
freedom.”

203

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. 1, ¶ 11 (New York 1869).
Id.
205
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1032 (1995) (arguing in favor of liability rule
rather than property rule because liability rule “possess[es] an information-forcing” quality
which facilitates “more efficient trade”); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil
Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 334-35 (1996) (arguing in favor of liability rules to promote
bargaining around compulsory licenses).
206
See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 205, at 1093-94 (arguing that, in case of dispute,
liability rule would minimize costs by facilitating exchange of information, while property
right rule would lead to deadlocks in negotiations). But see Robert P. Merges, Contracting
into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1293, 1304-05 (1996) (showing that Ayres & Talley’s model is inapplicable when more
than two parties are negotiating).
207
See discussion infra notes 234-49 and accompanying text.
208
MILL, supra note 203, ch. 4, ¶ 11.
204
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From a broader perspective, not limited to utilitarian or libertarian
arguments, it would be even more difficult to justify the choice of the
liability regime  the regime that, on the one hand, recognizes the
alienability of personal information and gives the initial entitlement
therein to individuals but, on the other hand, allows anyone but
individuals to decide whether that entitlement should be transferred and
at what price. It is preferable from the viewpoint of individual fairness
and collective benefit, as well as logic and intellectual consistency, to
regulate personal information through the property rule, which affords
the individual maximum control over personal information and allows
all interested parties to enter into mutually acceptable transactions
without tying up valuable societal resources. Privacy torts may still play
an important role under specific circumstances defining those torts  as
a separate claim (e.g., the tort of disclosure where the defendant
published highly embarrassing information voluntarily supplied by the
plaintiff for a narrow purpose) or an additional theory for recovery.
However, property should serve as a general paradigm for new
legislation regulating issues relating to personal information.
V.

WHOSE PROPERTY?

The choice of the property regime for regulating personal information
does not by itself determine how property rights should be allocated
between the individual and collectors. Why should the individual’s
claim to her personal information be prior to the claim of collectors? On
the intuitive level, the answer is that this information exists regardless of
whether or not it has been collected. It exists as an extension of the
individual’s personality  just like the individual’s name or likeness
that are protected by the right of publicity:
if one’s own image, for example, is treated as an object capable of
‘being yours or mine,’ why should it not be claimed by the person
who is its natural source? To the extent it is available as some
person’s property. . . its source would seem to have the strongest
209
claim.

Various theories of property may serve to support this intuitive
210
conclusion. Most recognized among those are the Lockean labor-

209

Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J.
383, 418 (1999).
210
See Symposium, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? Examined Lives:
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1380 (2000)
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and the “personality” theory.

213

A. Locke: Labor-Desert Theory
The labor-desert theory, at first glance, seems to protect the rights of
collectors rather than the rights of individuals because it suggests that a
person who invests her labor in a common good acquires a property
214
right in it.
At a closer look, however, one would reach a different
conclusion. Locke based his theory on the assumption that in the
primitive state of nature there are enough unclaimed goods so that
everyone can appropriate the objects of their labor without infringing
215
upon goods that have been appropriated by others. It follows that one
may acquire property rights in a good by investing one’s labor only if the
good is not already owned by someone else.
At the same time, Locke’s primary underlying assumption is that
216
“every Man has a Property in his own Person.” A “person” for Locke is
“a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and
217
places.”
Using modern terms, Locke defines a person through the
individual’s personal identity, which, among other things, should
include the individual’s personal information  the unique collection of
facts that makes the individual who she is. If that is the case, then
everyone has an original property right in her personal information, i.e.,
(“Mainstream property theorists recognize two main theoretical justifications for
ownership: Lockean labor-desert theory, and a more explicitly utilitarian theory that
focuses on economic efficiency.”); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77
GEO. L.J. 287, 288 (1988) (“The main alternative to a labor justification is a ‘personality
theory’ that describes property as an expression of the self.”).
211
See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed. rev.
1963) (1690) (developing theory of property based on individual investment of labor in
common good).
212
See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Morals and Legislations, in 1 SELECT
EXTRACTS FROM THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 1-4, 11-12 (Thoemmes Press 1995) (1843)
(developing theory of property of law based on maximization of welfare).
213
See generally GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. M. Knox
trans., 1942) (developing theory of property and personhood).
214
See, e.g., Harris S. Gordon, et al., Customer Relationship Management: A Senior
Management Guide to Technology for Creating a Customer-Centric Business, at http://www.thedma.org/bookstore/cgi/displaybook?product_id=009163 (last visited Mar. 1, 2003)
(regarding personally identifiable data as property of collectors who have invested in
compiling databases).
215
See LOCKE, supra note 211, at 33.
216
See id. at 328-29.
217
See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING II. xxvii, § 11, 44849 (A. Frager ed., 1894) (1690).
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personal information does not exist in the state of nature, it is already
owned.
Under Lockean theory, therefore, collectors of personal
information should not be permitted to acquire a property right that is
superior to the property right of the individual who is the subject matter
of the collected data  just as someone who picks flowers in a
neighbor’s front yard may not acquire property rights in these flowers
218
superior to the property rights of the neighbor.
B. Utilitarian Theory
Under the utilitarian theory, rights should be allocated so as to
219
maximize human satisfaction or benefit.
Modern utilitarians have
220
interpreted this to mean mainly economic efficiency.
The role of
property law in such interpretation is to facilitate wealth-maximizing
221
transactions.
For that reason, in deciding “whether the law should allow a magazine
to sell its subscriber list to another magazine without obtaining the
222
subscribers’ consent,” Richard Posner looks only to transaction-cost
considerations. Posner concludes that the property right in personal
information should be assigned away from the individual because to the
seller “the cost of obtaining the subscriber approval would be high
223
relative to the value of the list.”
On the other hand, the cost to the
subscriber would be low since the disclosed information is trivial;
therefore, the purchaser of the list would not be able to “use it to impose
224
substantial costs on the subscribers.”
This view is vulnerable on both empirical and theoretical grounds.
Empirical studies do not seem to support the assumption that the
assignment of property rights in personal information to its collectors

218
See infra notes 311-16 and accompanying text (discussing whether collector should
have any property rights in acquired data).
219
See generally BENTHAM, supra note 212.
220
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 36-39, 271-89 (4th ed. 1988)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 357 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE] (applying economic
approach to law and legal doctrine). See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347-48 (1967) (developing theory of property rights and
externalities, including costs and benefits).
221
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968)
(arguing that rational actors seek to maximize their wealth when they covet common
property as their own).
222
Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 398 (1978).
223
Id.
224
Id. at 398-99.
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reduces transaction costs. As pointed out by Kenneth C. Laudon, those
who advocate maintaining the status quo for the sake of efficiency “are
225
ignorant of the enormous cost of the existing set of arrangements,”
under which individuals are bombarded by calls, e-mails, and mailings
that they do not wish to receive.
It has been estimated that telemarketers make eighteen million calls a
226
227
day, the vast majority of which are unsuccessful.
Each year, one
hundred million trees are cut down in the United States to produce 4.5
million tons of junk mail; 44% of it goes straight to the waste dumps
228
unopened and unread.
Studies have shown that, frustrated with inadequate laws and
practices, individuals spend inordinate amounts of time and money
trying to protect themselves from unwanted intrusion. These costs
constitute a privacy toll and are associated with stopping spam, junk mail,
229
and telemarketing calls, avoiding identity theft, and protecting privacy
230
on the Internet. A privacy-sensitive family could spend between $200
225

Laudon, supra note 13, at 102-03 (reporting that out of 14.5 billion catalogues
distributed to homes in 1994, 75% were tossed out within five seconds of receipt).
226
Liz Crenshaw, Telemarketers & Direct Mail, NBC4.COM, available at
http://www.nbc4.com/frequentlyaskedforarchive/1165499/detail.html (last visited Mar.
1, 2003).
227
Laudon, supra note 13, at 103.
228
See Native Forest Network, supra note 8.
229
See Identity-Theft Complaints Almost Double in 2002, at http://www.cnn.com
/2003/TECH/ptech/01/22/identity.theft.ap/index.html (Jan. 23, 2003) (reporting that,
according to Justice Department, up to 700,000 people in United States may be victimized
by identity bandits each year). The FTC has reported that the number of identity theft
complaints rose from about 86,000 in 2001 to about 162,000 in 2002. Of last year’s incidents,
42% involved credit card fraud. Other major categories involved fraudulent bank and cell
phone accounts. According to the FTC, it costs an average victim more than $1,000 in
expenses to cope with the damage to her accounts and reputation. Id.
230
Elements of the Privacy Toll:
Identity Theft
$39.95 a year for two
Credit Watch
$79.90
adults
$8.50 a year for two
Credit Reports
adults at two credit
$34.00
bureaus
(There are three major credit
bureaus. These services will
cover all three.)
Telemarketing
Avoidance
Caller ID with Name
$7.50 per month
$90.00
Unlisted Number
$1.50 per month
$18.00
Internet Privacy
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231

and $300 and many hours annually to protect their privacy.
232
Consumers, businesses, and the public at large pay the privacy toll. In
a recent report to Congress, the FTC estimated that online retail sales lost
233
due to privacy concerns may be worth as much as $18 billion.
In addition to the empirical evidence disclosing the losses resulting
from the current allocation of property rights in personal information,
economists have argued that the current property regime is inefficient by
234
its very design since it generates externalities.
In this context,
Anonymization Service

$50 per year

$50.00

Junk Mail
Opting out
Total Annual Costs

12/year @ $.50 per opt$6.00
out
$277.90

Time Losses
Spam download time
Spam deletion time

5 hours/year
2 hours/year

Intangible and
Unmeasured Costs
Higher credit costs due to ID
theft
Costs incurred directly by ID
theft victims (hundreds or
thousands of dollars per
victim)
Disruptions and aggravation
from unwanted
telemarketing calls
Consumer losses due to
telemarketing fraud that rely
on targeted marketing data
Internet service outages and
delays due to spam (losses to
consumers and to businesses)
Internet costs due to capacity
necessary to support spam
(costs to ISPs, users, and
others)
Gellman, supra note 29.
231
See id.
232
Id. (noting that people will not purchase items on Internet and otherwise when they
fear that their personal information may be misused).
233
See Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices
in the Electronic Marketplace 2 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000
/privacy2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2003); see also Gellman, supra note 29 (pointing out
that consumers routinely abandon shopping carts on websites because of demands for too
much personal information).
234
Laudon, supra note 13, at 103 (criticizing Posner for failure “to account for the
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externalities mean that social costs (economic as well as non-economic)
associated with the accumulation and trading of personal information
are not fully borne by primary and secondary collectors. Instead, part of
the cost is imposed on individuals whose privacy is invaded, and
235
another part on society in general. The “subsidy” enjoyed by collectors
encourages wasteful behavior  companies over-invest in reaching
consumers who do not wish to hear from them and under-invest in
technology that would permit them to satisfy individual privacy
236
preferences.
Proponents of the law and economics theory often argue that
“restrictions on the free flow of information in the name of privacy are
generally not social wealth maximizing, because they inhibit
237
decisionmaking, increase transaction costs, and encourage fraud.”
They maintain that the more information about an individual is
available, the more difficult it is for people to lie about themselves, and
the cheaper it is for their counterparties to evaluate the risks associated
238
with dealing with them.
The efficiency of this regime, however, is less than obvious. In the real
world, information about an individual is never absolutely complete or
239
accurate. It is also never objective in the sense that the very method of
its selection (what facts are relevant) reflects certain ideology as well as
biases and prejudices. If an individual has no control over dissemination
of her personal information, does not know what facts may determine a

negative information externalities inherent in the new information age”).
235
Id. at 99 (citing “regulatory agencies, congressional hearings, federally funded study
groups, and a small industry of privacy experts” as examples of expenditures imposed on
society at large).
236
See Schwartz, supra note 106, at 833; see also Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing
Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 87 (2003) (suggesting that telemarketers create externalities
by ignoring costs they impose on consumers and other telemarketers).
237
Murphy, supra note 16, at 2382 (summarizing principal arguments of law and
economics scholars); see also Posner, supra note 222, at 397-400 (arguing that privacy claims
often reflect attempts of plaintiffs to perpetrate fraud by maintaining public image they do
not deserve); George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 623, 632-33 (1980) (“The more costly the acquisition of knowledge, the more
expensive it becomes to enter into transactions with new parties. We should expect less
mobility of laborers, creditors, etc., and some increase in the dispersion of prices.”). See
generally Symposium, The Law and Economics of Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 621 (1980).
238
See Stigler, supra note 237, at 628-33.
239
See Privacy and Consumer Profiling, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy
/profiling/#introduction#introduction (last updated Feb. 3, 2003) (reporting serious
problems with accuracy of profiling data). For instance, in April 2001, former Privacy
Foundation CTO Richard Smith requested his ChoicePoint dossier and concluded that the
file contained “more misinformation than correct information.” Id.
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counterparty’s decision, and has no ability to correct errors in her record,
that by itself may lead to economically inefficient behavior by all parties
to a transaction. Furthermore, many potential participants may be
deterred from entering the market much in the same way many able
candidates are already deterred from entering political life by fear of
240
unlimited exposure and unwanted publicity.
As a result, the legal
regime that, in the name of efficiency, imposes the burden of protecting
privacy on individuals is likely, in the long run, to be inefficient.
Even if this law and economics analysis were correct, the collective
241
lack of privacy may still be inefficient. The unlimited dissemination of
personal information restricts individuals’ ability to present themselves
differently to different people, which, apart from any fraud, is important
for establishing new relationships as well as for personal change and
242
243
growth. Unavoidable clerical errors put at risk the legitimate interest
244
This interest is not only personal in
people have in their reputations.
nature  it is also an investment, similar to the investment a corporation
makes in its good will; therefore, on a societal scale, damage to personal
reputations results in an economic loss to the society as a whole. These
costs, shifted from specific market participants to the public at large are,
however, not accounted for in the current property regime.

240
See, e.g., Gerald F. Seb, Powell’s Exit Sparks Debate Over Shape of Politics in America,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1995, at A1 (stating that Powell’s reluctance to enter race is partly due
to concern for family’s privacy).
241
See Gellman, supra note 29, § 3.F.3 (arguing that greater use of personal information
for enhancement of private sector marketing activities has significant slippery slope
problem, and that targeted marketing might be greatly enhanced if personal income tax
records or medical records were freely available to marketers). However, it is clear that
most Americans would not tolerate this type of activity. Id.
242
See Graham, supra note 97, at 1404.
243
Stigler concedes that “[e]rror is of course unavoidable” but argues that “there are
substantial incentives for information agencies to keep the error in reasonable bounds. The
rejection of a sound debtor or acceptance of a deadbeat are clearly costly to a merchant.”
Stigler, supra note 237, at 626. In a law and economics dream world, with complete
information on all sides of a transaction and zero transaction costs, this argument would be
true. However, in the real world, neither merchants nor customers learn about clerical
errors as soon as they happen. Thus, the cost of such errors may factor into a price
differential. The value of an error to a customer may significantly exceed its value to a
merchant, i.e., the merchant will have no incentive to correct it. In theory, a customer could
go to a different merchant, the one that produces fewer errors. Yet, in a world in which
individuals have no control over their personal information, how will the customer
compare which merchant keeps the most accurate files?
244
See Murphy, supra note 16, at 2385 (arguing that reputations are valuable personal
assets).
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245

A standard remedy to the externalities problem is “internalizing” the
246
costs, i.e., reallocating property rights or creating other incentives that
247
would spread the costs of producing a benefit to all parties involved.
Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, who view privacy as an externality
problem, explain:
I may be adversely affected by the way people use information
about me and there may be no way that I can easily convey my
preferences to these parties. The solution to this externality problem
is to assign property rights in information about individuals to those
individuals. They can then contract with other parties, such as
direct mail distributors, about how they might use the
248
information.

To summarize my arguments, both the empirical evidence and
theoretical considerations of economists support the view that the
current property regime with respect to personal information is
inefficient and should be revised. Even if, as a result of that revision,
transaction costs rise, they will rise only as far as necessary to pay for the
249
cost of invading privacy.
Additionally, the increased cost would
discourage “the obnoxious use of information that could undermine the
250
foundations of a free society if left unchecked.” As Kenneth C. Laudon
has pointed out, “[t]here should be no free lunch when it comes to
251
invading privacy.”

245
Some economists have argued that it may be in the interest of society as a whole not
to fight externalities if doing so would discourage some socially valuable activity. For
instance, taxing a manufacturer for pollution that damages a neighboring property is
inefficient compared to simply removing or compensating the owners of the damaged
properties. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960)
(comparing two regimes  one where business is liable for damage it causes, and other
where injured party is held responsible for damage to its property). However, as Kenneth
C. Laudon correctly points out, “[t]his argument makes little sense when applied to either
privacy invasion or to environmental pollution on a massive scale. How do you move
away from privacy invasion and avoid experiencing the costs?” Laudon, supra note 13, at
103.
246
See Demsetz, supra note 220, at 352 (noting that internalizing usually involves
change in property rights).
247
See id. at 347-57.
248
Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, U.S. Government Information Policy, available at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/policy/policy.html (July 30, 1997) (“The
right way to think about privacy, in our opinion, is that it is an externality problem.”).
249
Laudon, supra note 13, at 103.
250
Id.
251
Id.
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Moreover, economic costs and benefits represent only one, albeit
important, consideration in evaluating the social benefits of the current
252
allocation of property rights in personal information. The legal system
protects and advances many values and concerns, both economic and
253
non-economic.
Certain values in our society are considered so
important that distribution of property rights contradicting those values
would be viewed as impermissible even if it were economically efficient.
The nineteenth century arguments about the abolition of slavery did
not in the slightest depend upon the relationship of slavery to
material output. The abolitionist of that or any other era regards it
as immaterial that the liberation of the slaves might reduce
transaction costs or increase the gross national product. . . . This
position. . . rests upon the. . . belief that each person has a natural
right to own his person as a condition of birth and as part of the
recognition of his common humanity. Liberty, freedom and
personal autonomy are ideals of the law, and they cannot be
reduced to simple efficiency considerations, however important
254
efficiency may be in its own right.
255

Privacy is certainly perceived as one of such values.
As one poll
showed, 79% of the public believe that, if the Framers of the Declaration
of Independence were rewriting that document today, they would add
256
privacy to the trinity of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Privacy serves numerous non-economic functions, including freedom
257
and liberty, essential for a democratic society.
For that reason, the
Constitution protects privacy rights of individuals against the federal
and state governments. In recent years, however, exchange of personal
data between the public and private sectors has significantly expanded,

252
See Gellman, supra note 29 (“Arguments that focus solely on monetary costs and
benefits miss a major part of the privacy debate.”).
253
Richard Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. REV. 455,
456 (1978).
254
Id. at 456-57.
255
In a recent poll, participants ranked privacy just behind the freedom of speech and
ahead of the freedom of religion and the right to vote as the most important American
right. See Alan F. Westin, Intrusions. Privacy Trade-Offs in a Free Society, PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE
(Nov./Dec. 2000), available at http://216.239.51.100/search?q=cache:zhMy9VKOf_QC:
www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/pubper/pdf/pp116a.pdf+harris+poll+1990+79%25+declarati
on+independence&hl=en.
256
See EPIC Public Opinion on Privacy, supra note 26 (reporting results of 1990 Harris
Poll).
257
See Laudon, supra note 13, at 103 (criticizing Posner for failing to recognize noneconomic value of privacy).
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thus weakening the constitutional protection against the government.
For example, privacy advocates have noted the increasing flow of
consumer data from private sector databanks to law enforcement
agencies:
Big Brother isn’t gone. He’s just been outsourced. After
surveillance scandals in the 1960s and 1970s, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other federal law-enforcement authorities curbed
their file-keeping on U.S. citizens. But in the past several years, the
FBI, the Internal Revenue Service and other agencies have started
buying troves of personal data from the private sector. . . . Do
Americans want the records of their purchases, activities, and
interests available online for casual use by the FBI and other law
enforcement agencies without any requirement for a court order or
259
search warrant?

Legal ownership of personal information would guarantee individuals
the most effective control over their privacy. Each individual would be
able to decide on her own how much personal information she is willing
to share in exchange for a monetary or non-monetary gain. For
utilitarians, concerned with the most complete satisfaction of preferences
of as many members of the society as possible, that solution should be
completely acceptable.
As for the preferences themselves, numerous polls and studies have
consistently demonstrated that people are concerned about their inability
260
to control personal information and that they would like to change the
258
See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 29 (expressing concern that, as “the line between the
public and private sectors regarding personal data grows ever less clear, the protections
against government weaken”).
259
Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on You, It May
Ask Choicepoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A1 (describing how private sector companies
specialize in collecting and compiling personal information from multiple sources,
including credit bureaus, marketers and public records, and raising concern that this
information is sold to dozens of government agencies).
260
See, e.g., EPIC Public Opinion on Privacy, supra note 26 (discussing August 2001
Yankee Group survey of 3000 online consumers that found that 83% of respondents are
somewhat or very concerned about privacy on Internet); see also Humphrey Taylor, Most
People Are “Privacy Pragmatists” Who, While Concerned about Privacy, Will Sometimes Trade It
Off for Other Benefits, HARRIS INTERACTIVE, at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_
poll/index.asp?PID=365 (March 19, 2003) (reporting that 79% of participants of most recent
Harris poll believe that it is extremely important to be in control of who can get personal
information); Marlon Manuel, What’s for Sale? You. Atlantans Feel Victimized by Companies
that Require Personal Data, Profit From It, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 24, 2002, at 1A
(discussing poll of 2,400 adults in 15 metro Atlanta counties conducted by Marketing
Workshop finding that 65% of participants view selling and buying personal information
as invasion of privacy); IBM-Harris Multi-National Consumer Privacy Survey, PRIVACY & AM.
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current law, which has proven incapable of protecting their privacy. In
fact, prior to the events of September 11, many Americans singled out
“loss of personal privacy” as the top concern for the twenty-first
262
century.
Therefore, changing the current property regime governing
rights in personal information to give priority to the individual is
warranted under the utilitarian theory by (i) the objective increase of
economic and non-economic benefits to the public in general and (ii) the
subjective satisfaction of preferences expressed by the significant
majority of the society.
C. Personality Theory
263

The personality theory of property originates in Hegel’s philosophy.
The underlying premise of the personality theory is that to achieve

BUS. (Ctr. for Soc. & Legal Research), Jan. 2000, at 1 (discussing December 1999 IBM-Harris
Multi-National Consumer Privacy Survey finding that in United States 94% of consumers
think that personal information is vulnerable to misuse, compared to 78% in United
Kingdom and 72% in Germany).
261
See EPIC Public Opinion on Privacy, supra note 26 (reporting that, based on numerous
polls, Americans consider current self-regulatory framework insufficient to protect
privacy). A February 2003 Harris Poll showed that 53% of all adults disagree that “existing
laws and organizational practices provide a reasonable level of protection for consumer
privacy today.” This is an increase of fifteen points from 38% in 1999. See Taylor, supra
note 260 (analyzing results of most recent Harris poll). A June 2001 Gallup poll indicated
that two-thirds of respondents favored new federal legislation to protect privacy online.
See Majority of E-mail Users Express Concern about Internet Privacy, GALLUP POLL NEWS
SERVICE, available at http://www.gallup.com/subscription/?m=f&c_id=10732 (June 28,
2001). A March 2000 BusinessWeek/Harris Poll found that 57% of respondents favored
laws that would regulate how personal information is used. See Business Week/Harris Poll:
A Growing Threat, BUS. WEEK ON LINE at http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_12/b367
3010.htm (Mar. 20, 2000). In that same poll, only 15% supported self-regulation. Id.; see also
Reidenberg, supra note 16, at 884 (reporting that at public referendum on privacy citizens of
North Dakota repealed recent state law that weakened privacy protection and restored optin rule for financial information by vote of 72% to 28%).
262
EPIC ALERT, at http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_6.15.html (Sept. 23, 1999).
A 1999 Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll of 2,025 adults by phone found that the loss of
personal privacy was the number one concern of Americans. Id. In that pre-September 11
poll, 29% of respondents reported that the “loss of personal privacy” was a top concern. Id.
Privacy outranked other high-profile concerns such as overpopulation (23%), terrorist acts
(23%), racial tensions (17%), world war (16%), and global warming (14%). Id.
263
In one of the most quoted paragraphs of the PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, Hegel states:
A person has as his substantive end the right of putting his will into any and
every thing and thereby making it his, because it has no such end in itself and
derives its destiny and soul from his will. This is the absolute right of
appropriation which man has over all “things.”
HEGEL, supra note 213, ¶ 44.
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proper self-development  to be a person  an individual needs some
264
control over resources in the external environment.
That control is
most commonly assured through the system of property rights 
“property is the first embodiment of freedom and so is in itself a
265
substantive end.”
In the last couple of decades, Hegel’s theory of “property for
personhood” has received interesting development in the work of
266
Margaret Jane Radin. She views ownership as a relationship between
an individual and an object and distinguishes two types of property 
“property that is bound up with a person and property that is held
purely instrumentally  personal property and fungible property,
267
respectively.”
Property is bound with an individual if its loss can be remedied only
268
by the return of the lost object.
Conversely, property is held only for
instrumental reasons if it is “perfectly replaceable with other goods of
269
equal market value.” For example, “if a wedding ring is stolen from a
jeweler, insurance proceeds can reimburse the jeweler, but if a wedding
ring is stolen from a loving wearer, the price of a replacement will not
270
restore the status quo  perhaps no amount of money can do so.”
Accordingly, Radin argues that the two types of property should be
treated differently, and personal property, the “property for
personhood,” should receive stronger legal protection because it is
271
essential to the individual’s “sense of continuity of self over time.”
Therefore, in a property dispute between two rival claimants, special,
and often decisive, consideration should be given to the relationship of
264
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982)
(discussing Hegel’s philosophy).
265
HEGEL, supra note 213, ¶ 45.
266
See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability] (exploring significance of marketinalienability and its justifications); Radin, supra note 264 (exploring relationship between
one’s property and personhood); Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation of Computing and
Information Technology: Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509 (1996) [hereinafter
Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace] (discussing scope of copyright protection in
cyberspace); Margaret Jane Radin, Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American
Legal Thought: The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990) [hereinafter
Radin, Renaissance of Pragmatism] (exploring link between pragmatism and feminism with
Hegel).
267
Radin, supra note 264, at 960.
268
Id. at 959 (“An object is closely related to one’s personhood if its loss causes pain that
cannot be relieved by the object’s replacement.”).
269
Id. at 960.
270
Id. at 959.
271
Id. at 1004.
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272

each claimant to the property in question. For example, “if some object
were so bound up with me that I would cease to be ‘myself’ if it were
taken, then a government that must respect persons ought not to take
273
it.”
Radin’s theory provides strong support for a default rule that would
grant initial entitlement in personal information to individuals. In fact,
what can be more essential to an individual’s “sense of continuity of self
274
over time”
than personal information  one’s name, personal
attributes, and the record of interests, preferences, past acts and choices?
Conversely, the same personal information for a collector is just a
commodity easily replaceable with money, as that routinely occurs in the
course of a transfer from one collector to another.
Although the personality theory supports the priority of the
individual’s right in personal property, it may also require that the right
remain inalienable. Radin has consistently argued that things necessary
275
for human flourishing should not be commodified. On the other hand,
she recognizes that “market-inalienabilities are unjust when they are too
276
harmful to personhood in our non-ideal world.” To mediate this kind
of injustice, Radin has advocated incomplete commodification of things
important to personhood. She explains,
In the non-ideal world we do live in, market-inalienability must be
judged against a background of unequal power. In that world it
may sometimes be better to commodify incompletely than not to
commodify at all. Market-inalienability may be ideally justified in
light of an appropriate conception of human flourishing, and yet
sometimes be unjustifiable because of our non-ideal
277
circumstances.

Whether we like it or not, in our non-ideal world, personal
information has already been commodified.
Benefits of that
commodification seem to be enjoyed by all market participants, save
individuals, which is both unjust and harmful to their personhood. In
addition, consensual release of personal information is important to
society as a whole. Allowing individuals to decide for themselves
whether, and on what terms, they would be willing to release

272
273
274
275
276
277

See id.
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1004.
See generally Radin, Market Inalienability, supra note 266.
Id. at 1937.
Id. at 1903.
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information about themselves to commercial enterprises would promote
individuals’ sense of control over their lives, which is essential to
“human flourishing.” I will discuss later in this Article how individual
rights should be balanced against the rights and interests of other
members of the community (and, in that sense, only partially
commodified). However, the fact that personal information is important
to personhood should not make it inalienable.
One might argue that assigning individuals property rights in their
personal information would transform “property for personhood” into
tangible property, thus eliminating the individual’s arguable moral
advantage over collectors. That is not true. The fact that a person may
decide to sell or pawn her wedding ring does not automatically strip the
wedding ring of its special emotional value.
State insolvency laws routinely allow individual bankrupts to keep
278
their family homes, photo albums, letters, and diaries.
And if the
exemption for homes may be partly explained under the theory of a
“fresh start,” letters and pictures are clearly exempted because of their
status as “property for personhood,” which does not mean that their
owner may not choose at some point to part with them. These examples
show that the law already offers special treatment to “property for
personhood” even though it is understood that that property is not
inalienable in the hands of the owner. Personal information should
279
enjoy similar treatment, and “a government that must respect persons”
ought to give property rights of individuals priority over property rights
of collectors.
D. Blackmail Argument
In addition to the theories outlined above, the following paradox from
the area of criminal law provides logical and moral support to the
intuitive sense that individuals should have preferential rights in their
personal information. That paradox is blackmail, and over the years it
has attracted the attention of numerous legal scholars who tried to
280
explain: why is blackmail illegal?
278
See, e.g., Lee v. Mercantile First Nat’l Bank, 765 S.W.2d 17 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989)
(allowing debtors to keep residential property due to homestead exemption but ordering
sale of commercial property to satisfy debt).
279
Radin, supra note 264, at 1005.
280
See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS 61 (Harvard University
Press 1996) (noting that each generation of scholars comes to blackmail puzzle, “as to some
muddy and treacherous test track, to try out their new theories). The test is an apparently
simple one: to find out whether their approach will answer the question ‘why is blackmail
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The essence of the paradox is that the crime of blackmail consists of
two elements that, taken separately, are perfectly legal  a demand for
payment (or other benefit) and a threat to expose some personal
281
information.
Why then does a combination of two non-criminal
elements result in a crime? Undeniably, when the concealed information
concerns an illegal act, the society has a strong interest in forbidding
private arrangements that jeopardize punishment and prevention of
illegal behavior. But why should the society criminalize, effectively, a
sale of legal and merely embarrassing personal information?
Take the paradigmatic case of marital infidelity. If the blackmailer has
a right, but not a duty, to tell the victim’s wife about the victim’s
infidelities, why cannot she agree to forego that right in exchange for a
payment? This result seems abnormal because usually when a person
has a right to do or not do something, that means she is free to agree not
282
to exercise that right in exchange for some remuneration.
Various
283
theories of blackmail seek to explain that abnormality.
They can be
roughly grouped into: (i) moral arguments; (ii) economic-efficiency
arguments; and (iii) consequential arguments.
The essence of the moral argument is that there is something deeply
immoral (even if not illegal) either in the threat to expose the victim’s
284
secret, or in the exchange of silence for money.
Economic theories of

illegal?’”); id.; see also James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
670 (1984) (offering classification of theories explaining wrongfulness of blackmail). See
generally LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS 140-45 (1996) (analyzing various theories of
blackmail, including those by Epstein, Nozick, Feinberg, and Lindgren); Symposium,
Blackmail: Instead of a Preface, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1565 (1993).
281
See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 280, at 133 (noting that in canonical blackmail scenario,
blackmailer has right both to reveal victim’s infidelities to victim’s wife and to ask victim
for money; “[y]et when he combines these various innocent actions, paradoxically a crime
results  blackmail”).
282
Id.
283
For what James Boyle called “[b]y far the best survey” of the field of blackmail, see
James Lindgren, supra note 280, at 680-701.
284
See, e.g., ARTHUR L. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW
179 (1937) (distinguishing between “moral liberties” promoted by society and “immoral
liberties” merely tolerated by it, and concluding that surrender of immoral liberty, like
liberty to reveal damaging secret, may not be valid consideration for contract); ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 85 (Basic Books, Inc. 1974) (condemning blackmail
as “unproductive activity” in which victim systematically gains no benefit  victims
would be better off “if the blackmailer did not exist at all, and so wasn’t threatening them
[and] they would be no worse off if the exchange were known to be absolutely
impossible”); Wendy J. Gordon, The Force of Blackmail’s Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741,
1758 (1993) (seeing wrongfulness of blackmail in that “[o]ne person deliberately seeks to
harm another to serve her own ends  to exact money or other advantage  and does so
in a context where she has no conceivable justification for her act.”); KATZ, supra note 280,

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

BERGELSON_MACRO_-_NOVEMBER_21

434

University of California, Davis

11/22/2003 10:53 AM

[Vol. 37:379

blackmail are concerned primarily with the inefficiency of blackmail as a
system of private enforcement of law where the violator of a legal rule
pays the blackmailer a sum up to the amount of what the punishment
285
would be worth to that violator. Finally, consequential arguments put
emphasis not on the wrongfulness or inefficiency of blackmail itself but
rather on the negative impact it could have on the society if it were
286
legal.
All these arguments explain why the society may find blackmail
objectionable  there is no common benefit in immoral, economically
inefficient, or potentially dangerous activity. However, there is a long
way to go between finding an activity objectionable and criminalizing it.
The same moral, economic-efficiency, and consequential arguments can
be used against, say, marital infidelity, but most states no longer
287
criminalize adultery, leaving it to the sphere of private relations, like

at 158-62 (seeing wrongfulness of blackmail in blackmailer’s ability to force victim to
choose between two evils  theft (or another criminal encroachment) and revealing
victim’s secret); Lindgren, supra note 280, at 702 (finding blackmail morally objectionable
because blackmailer exploits leverage which belongs to someone else, namely, to third
party from whom victim is trying to hide secret).
285
See, e.g., William Landis & Richard Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 42 (1975) (arguing that blackmail is inefficient both when “secret” discovered by
blackmailer involves illegal act, as well as when there is nothing illegal about that “secret”).
In the former scenario,
[O]verenforcement of the law would result if the blackmailer were able to extract
the full fine from the offenders. . . . Alternatively, the blackmailer might sell his
incriminating information to the offender for a price lower than the statutory cost
of punishment to the criminal, which would reduce the effective cost of
punishment to the criminal below the level set by legislature.
Id. As for the latter case, Landis and Posner argue that, if a society has not prohibited
certain behavior that means the society decided not to expend social resources on trying to
discover and punish it. Id. That social choice would be undermined if blackmailers were
allowed to pursue and punish people engaged in a legal activity. Id. at 43.
286
See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 564 (1983) (arguing
that blackmail should be outlawed because blackmailer aids victim in concealing some
damaging information (i.e., facilitates fraud on third party or public at large)). In addition,
Epstein argues that blackmail creates strong incentives for a victim to satisfy the
blackmailer’s monetary demands: “[d]o we believe that [the victim] would never resort to
fraud or theft given this kind of pressure, when the very nature of the transaction cuts off
his access to the usual financial sources, such as banks or friends, who would want to know
the purpose of the loan?” Id.; see also Jeffrie Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63
MONIST 156, 164-66 (1980) (expressing concern that without law of blackmail there would
be incentives for invasions of privacy).
287
See, e.g., Martin J. Siegel, For Better or For Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30
J. FAM. L. 45, 49-54 (1991-92) (discussing efforts to decriminalize adultery and pointing out
that majority of states have now decriminalized adultery, and remaining laws are rarely
enforced).
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any other private imperfection.
Why then criminalize a voluntary transfer of information from a
blackmailer to the victim, or  using the terms adopted in this paper 
from a collector to the individual?
After all, if the same
collector/blackmailer chose to offer the information to a tabloid instead
of the individual/victim, there would be nothing legally objectionable.
The collector/blackmailer could use identical language in dealing with
the individual and the tabloid: “I have some valuable compromising
information regarding X. If you want, you can have it for $1000. If not, I
am selling it to The New York Post.” The individual/victim is even likely
to be happy that he has received the “right of first refusal” and thus
avoided what he perceives as a more serious harm. So why is it legal to
sell personal information to a third party but not to the individual
himself?
The answer to all these questions lies, in my view, in the respective
rights of the collector/blackmailer and the individual/victim to the
discovered personal information. They may be compared to the
relationship of “bailors” and “bailees.” In the situation of involuntary
288
bailment  lost and found property  a finder has rights against the
289
whole world except for the true owner. The finder may sell or pledge
the ring she found to a third party; if she later loses the ring, she will
290
have the right to recover it from a subsequent finder.
However, she
may not sell the ring to the true owner because the finder’s property
right is inferior to the right of the owner. The same is true in the
291
situation of a voluntary bailment.
In both instances, if a bailee
conditioned the return of property to its lawful owner on remuneration
(other than pursuant to a prior agreement), she would be guilty of

288
Possession by a finder is often characterized as involuntary bailment. See JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 105-06 n.2 (5th ed. 2002) (comparing rights of
owners, voluntary and involuntary bailees, and subsequent possessors).
289
See, e.g., Armory v. Delamirie, K.B. 1722, 1 Strange 505 (holding that “the finder of a
jewel, though he does not by such finding acquire an absolute property or ownership, yet
he has such a property as will enable him to keep it against all but the rightful owner”); see
also RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 26 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed.
1975) (explaining that “the title of a finder is good as against the whole world but the true
owner”).
290
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 288, at 104.
291
Voluntary bailment may, in addition, impose on the bailee higher obligations of care
with respect to the entrusted property, although the modern trend is to apply uniform
standard of “reasonable care under the circumstances” across the board. See Richard H.
Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liabilities of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform Standard of
Reasonable Care, 41 KAN. L. REV. 97, 99 (1992).
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292

theft.
A similar principle applies to the rights of a collector and the
individual whose personal information has been either discovered by a
collector (analogously to involuntary bailment) or entrusted by the
individual (analogously to voluntary bailment). The possession of this
information may give a collector some property rights but they are
subordinate to the rights of the individual. A different default rule, one
that assigns priority either to a collector or to the public at large, would
lead to an unappealing implication that the blackmailer who collected
personal information about her victim should be allowed to make the
293
victim pay for it.
The blackmail analogy, together with principal
theories of property, demonstrates that, although a collector may have
rights in individuals’ personal information, these rights should be
subordinate to the rights of the individuals.
VI. BALANCING INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL, SOCIETY, AND COLLECTORS
The fact that individuals should have a prior property right in their
personal information does not mean that this right should be absolute or
exclusive. Personal information, like information in general, differs from
traditional forms of property. It can be possessed by more than one
294
person, it is not destroyed in the act of consumption, it does not lose
value when used and, conversely, may lose value when it is not used
295
and becomes obsolete.
Personal information has certain similarities with intellectual property,
296
in particular copyright. One can look at people as the authors of their
292
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.5 (defining theft of property lost, mislaid, or
delivered by mistake).
293
This conclusion made Posner, for instance, insert a footnote questioning his own
argument that personal information about an individual should be public:

If I am correct that the facts about a person should be in the public domain so
that those who have to decide whether to initiate (or continue) social or business
relations with the person will be able to do so on full information, does it not
follow that the Nosey Parker should be allowed to sell back the information he
obtains to the individual?
Posner, supra note 222, at 421 n.57.
294
See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International
News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 413 (1983) (“It is the nature of. . .
any. . . tangible property that possession by one person precludes possession by anyone
else. . . . Many people, however, can use the same piece of information.”).
295
See Mell, supra note 16, at 69 (noting that in certain respects personal information
“does not conform to the existing definitions of either personal or intangible property”).
296
Copyright protection serves to assure an author’s priority and limited monopoly in a
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own lives, generating information as they develop their personalities.
In fact, in Europe, personal information is viewed similarly to intellectual
298
In the United States, however, copyright protects only the
property.
299
expressive content of the work, not the ideas or facts contained therein.
Consequently, personal information is outside the subject matter of
American copyright law. There have been suggestions made to broaden
300
the scope of copyright protection to include personal information. This
solution would certainly enhance protection of individual privacy. On
the other hand, it raises slippery-slope concerns: it could open the door
to treating information in general as a copyrightable material and could
301
lead to creating a monopoly on information.
Instead of trying to stretch one or another traditional category to cover
personal information, it may be worth recognizing it as a new bundle of
rights, which combines elements of traditional property and intellectual
property, as well as property and privacy. Due to its special nature,
more than one person in the society may have a legitimate interest in
personal information. Accordingly, that limits the scope of property
rights that ought to be granted to individuals.

particular form of expression and is automatically granted to all “original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
297
Solove, supra note 99, at 1112.
298
Angela R. Broughton et al., International Employment, 33 INT’L LAW. 291, 292 (1999)
(pointing out that, culturally, Europeans see personal data as akin to intellectual property).
Broughton explains:
Europeans believe corporations should not traffic in information without the
consent of its owner. To explain Europeans’ distrust of free transfers in personal
information, some have cited the Nazi government’s abuses of personal data to
further its aims. Others note that Europeans are bewildered by the U.S. fixation
on politicians’ sex lives. Europeans, unlike Americans, consider personal
information  be it about politicians, employees, or anyone else  private.
Id.
299
See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that
“Salinger has a right to protect the expressive content of his unpublished writings for the
term of his copyright,” but did not have protection for ideas or facts that were included
within).
300
See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 115159 (2000) (advocating licensing regime and privacy protection rules analogous to trade
secrets law).
301
See Volokh, supra note 81, at 1051 (“Before wholeheartedly endorsing the principle
that calling certain information ‘intellectual property’ lets the government restrict speech
communicating that information, we should think about the consequences of such an
endorsement.”).
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In her influential article about a computer “persona,” Patricia Mell
likens personal information to real property in medieval England and
303
argues that individuals should own it in “fee simple.” In Mell’s view,
the rights of all other interest groups (commercial enterprises, the public,
304
and the government) should be subordinate to those of the individual.
While agreeing in general with Mell’s property-based approach, I see
the individual’s rights with respect to personal information as
significantly less absolute. The society has an interest in the free flow of
information, and this interest needs to be taken into account. To give
individuals an unabridged right in their data would threaten to
immobilize it. Moreover, as has been discussed earlier, personal
information is not only property, it is also speech, which gives rise to an
inherent conflict between the value of privacy to the individual and the
305
value of free speech to the society. Finally, the original collector has a
legitimate interest in the personal information it collects in order to run
its business and better serve its customers.
To satisfy all those interests, I suggest that the property right of the
individual be limited in three respects. The first limitation should be its
duration. Normally, property rights do not expire. If I own a piece of
property, my devisees or heirs would inherit it, absent any explicit
condition or limitation attached to that particular property. One well
306
known exception to this rule is intellectual property. The limited rights
of the owner are the result of a trade-off between the needs of authors in
protecting their work and the needs of the society in the free flow of
ideas.
Conversely, personal rights, including the right to privacy, do
307
expire. The common law rule is that “the right of privacy dies with the

302
By “persona” Mell means “the various ways by which a person can be identified by
personal information about him.” Mell, supra note 16, at 3.
303
Id. at 76 (arguing that “[t]he persona should be viewed as property, the ultimate
‘ownership’ or ‘fee simple’ of which resides in the individual.”).
304
Id. (“The rights of any other entity (i.e., any group, class, association or government)
that might obtain, access, make use of, or disclose the persona would be subordinate to
those of the individual.”).
305
See discussion supra Part III.
306
Copyright protection is limited in duration to the life of the author plus 70 years for
individuals and the period of 95 years from the first publication or 120 years from creation,
whichever expires first, for works made for hire or by employees. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)-(c)
(2000); see also Aldon Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552-53 (2d Cir. 1984).
Patent rights generally expire after 20 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
307
See MCCARTHY, supra note 60, at 9-2; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 159§ 117,
at 851.
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308

individual.”
The only exception to this rule, recognized in
309
310
approximately one-third of all states, involves the right of publicity.
The majority rule that disallows the postmortem right to privacy (other
than the right of publicity) is based on the idea that this right protects
311
dignitary and reputational interests, which are inherently personal.
Once the subject is dead, the reason for protecting those rights
312
disappears.
The right of publicity, on the other hand, is a property
right; it protects against infringement of the commercial value
313
attributable to a human identity. Those states that extend the right of
publicity beyond the lifetime of the individual usually limit its
postmortem duration from as few as ten to as many as one hundred
314
years.
Arguments in favor of protecting personal information fit under the
logic of both traditional privacy (based on the notion that individuals
should be able to keep their actions, choices, and preferences secret) and
the right of publicity (based on the sense that individuals should receive
some economic benefit from the sale of their personal information). In
most instances, however, personal information has value for the
individual, collectors, and the public only during the lifetime of the
individual.
Generally speaking, individuals have few reasons to worry about
postmortem commercial use (not involving publication) of their personal
information, whether it be for marketing purposes, financial risk
assessment, or socio-political profiling. By the same token, commercial
enterprises should have very little interest in deceased customers. As for
publication, current law already protects individuals by disallowing
315
non-media entities from using the identities of deceased persons.

308

Fasching v. Kallinger, 510 A.2d 694, 701 (N.J. App. Ct. 1986).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 60, at 9-44, 9-45 (listing thirteenstates that have
established right of publicity, or at least most aspects of it, by statute, and noting that in
another four jurisdictions courts have found that their respective common law recognizes
postmortem right of publicity).
310
See id. at 9-3.
311
Id.
312
See id. at 9-3, 9-4.
313
See id. at 9-9 (listing arguments for and against postmortem right of publicity).
314
Id. at 9-54.1, 9-58 (noting that Oklahoma and Indiana statutes have longest
postmortem periods for right of publicity and that under Washington law, postmortem
duration of life of publicity where person’s identity has no commercial value is tenyears).
315
See Nature’s Way Prod., Inc. v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 245, 252-53 (D.
Utah 1990) (rejecting so-called “historical information exception” enjoyed by media when
claimed by seller of herbal medicines in order to use name of deceased well known author
and lecturer on herbal medicine).
309
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Finally, the society has to balance the burdens and benefits of the free
flow of information, on the one hand, and privacy, on the other. When
the individual whose privacy is at issue is dead, the protection of his
privacy loses its all important status compared to the need for full and
correct historical data. For all these reasons, the interest of an individual
in his personal information should not be a fee simple but rather a life
estate, which at the end of the individual’s lifetime springs to the public
domain.
The second limitation on individual property rights is necessary to
recognize the legitimate interest of the original collector. In the context
of a voluntary transaction with the individual, the original collector
should be granted a non-exclusive and unalienable automatic license in
the collected personal information. The collector should be allowed to
collect and use this information for its own research and marketing
purposes. Before transferring personal information to a third party,
however, the collector would have to obtain the affirmative consent of
the individual.
316
Concerns have been raised that a law limiting rights of enterprises in
respect of customer data already collected by them may amount to a
“taking” of private property for public good under the Fifth
317
Amendment.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a privacy
regulation that substantially interferes with a collector’s use of data that
he has collected or processed may constitute a “regulatory taking” and
318
require compensation.
A regulatory taking occurs when the government’s regulation “denies
319
an owner economically viable use” of his property. If Congress
enacted legislation that completely shifted property rights over personal
information from collectors to individuals, that legislation might very
well constitute a taking. However, legislation that would permit
enterprises to collect, store, and use personal data for any legitimate

316
See Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European Union and the
United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 207 (1999) (expressing concern that, “[i]f the government
prohibits the processing of personal data, it could deny the owner all or most of the
‘economically viable use’ of that data.”).
317
The Fifth Amendment states: “No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
318
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that
Environmental Protection Agency’s use of plaintiff’s proprietary research data constituted
compensable taking).
319
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); see also Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64 (1979).
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business purposes, other than its unauthorized transfer, would not deny
collectors all or most of the “economically viable use” of that
information.
In addition, the Supreme Court does not find a taking when a
320
regulation merely abates “nuisance-like” conduct, because one never
321
has a property right to harm others. Therefore, legislation that, on the
one hand, preserves the economic interests of collectors, and on the
other, protects individuals against unauthorized dissemination of their
personal information, should not violate the Fifth Amendment.
Finally, the third limitation on individual rights in personal
information should come in the form of non-exclusive automatic licenses
322
in favor of the society at large.
That limitation would allow the
government to collect and transfer certain personal information (e.g., for
purposes of tax collection, maintaining public records, or law
323
enforcement), subject, of course, to constitutional constraints. It would
also allow private, as well as public non-commercial, exchange of
personal information by citizens. Lastly, it would permit public media to
collect and publish any “newsworthy” personal information without
324
individual consent.
In addition, the license in favor of public media
would authorize transfer of personal information from a third party,

320
Under the current test, the government must show that the power to promulgate the
regulation stems from the “background principles of the State’s law of property and
nuisance.” See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
321
See Jan G. Laitos, The Takings Clause in America’s Industrial States After Lucas, 24 U.
TOL. L. REV. 281, 288 (1993) (pointing out that nuisance exception to Takings Clause is
consistent with language and intent of Takings Clause because, under nuisance law theory,
one does not have property right to harm others).
322
The rights and limitations pursuant to this license are beyond the scope of this
Article.
323
Cf. The Banks and Banking Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 332.15(a)(7) (2003) (disposing of
requirement of customer consent for disclosure of nonpublic personal information:

(i) To comply with Federal, State, or local laws, rules and other applicable legal
requirements;
(ii) To comply with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory
investigation, or subpoena or summons by Federal, State, or local authorities; or
(iii) To respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities having
jurisdiction over you for examination, compliance, or other purposes as
authorized by law.).
324
See Finger v. Omni Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141, 145 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that there was relationship between photograph of large family and fertility article
and that use of photograph without plaintiff’s consent did not violate prohibitions of New
York Rights of Privacy); see also NIMMER, supra note 98, ¶ 16.08, at 16-25 (stating that there
exists right of independent discovery, and information “obtained from unprotected or
published sources can be freely used independent of underlying property interest”).
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other than a commercial collector, to the media (e.g., an interview
concerning a public figure) and would protect the media if the
information supplied by a third-party collector was obtained by
325
unlawful means.
Current privacy law effectively recognizes all these “carve-outs.” For
instance, under both constitutional and tort law, media are immune from
326
liability for unauthorized use of personal identity as long as the
327
identity bears a reasonable relation to the news. The term “news” has
been interpreted broadly to include all media presentations of
328
information on public issues.
Thus, current law affords adequate
protection for information that should be disseminated on the basis of its
newsworthiness.
In a nutshell, the suggested legal regime would give individuals
property rights in their personal information. They would own this
information during their lifetime, subject to a (i) non-exclusive automatic
inalienable license to the original collector and (ii) limited non-exclusive
automatic license to the general public. This way, friends of, say, Robert
Bork would be free to talk, and newspapers free to write, about movies
he watches or books he reads, but a video- or bookstore would not be
free to reveal his customer records even in the heat of his nomination
campaign.

325
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (reasoning that right to privacy fails
when weighed against media’s right to publish matters of public interest despite private
nature, and illegal acquisition, of information).
326
Eastwood v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(“Publication of matters in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to
know, and the freedom of the press to tell it, cannot ordinarily be actionable.”).
327
See, e.g., Barrows v. Rozansky, 489 N.Y.S.2d 481, 485 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that “to be
privileged such use must be legitimately related to the informational value of the
publication and may not be a mere disguised commercialization of a person’s
personality”).
328
Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (N.Y. 1968). The court in
Paulsen explained:

The scope of the subject matter which may be considered of “public interest” or
“newsworthy” has been defined in most liberal and far reaching terms. The
privilege of enlightening the public is by no means limited to the dissemination
of news in the sense of current events but extends far beyond to include all types
of factual, educational and historical data, or even entertainment and
amusement, concerning interesting phases of human activity in general.
Id.
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VII. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION: SOME PRACTICAL
ISSUES
The proposed law should be codified in federal legislation with certain
fact-specific issues left to judicial interpretation. The federal nature of
the legislation would ensure consistency of citizens’ rights all over the
country and bring American law into accord with evolving international
privacy standards. Under that legislation, throughout their lifetimes,
individuals would have an option to keep their personal information
329
private, or conversely, sell, pledge, or license it.
Since the interest
owned is only a life estate, property rights in personal information
would not be devisable and would not pass by intestate succession.
Naturally, any personal information published by individuals
330
themselves would enter the public domain.
One could argue that by
simply making our information visible we “publish” it and thus give up
our property right to it. This argument is flawed. It focuses on the
outdated privacy rationale of secrecy instead of the more relevant
331
rationale of control. The difference between an affirmative decision to
publish certain information about oneself and information inadvertently
revealed through, say, browsing the Internet may be analogized to the
difference between abandoned and lost or stolen property. In the first
case, the owner relinquishes her property rights while in the second case
she does not. I do not give up my property right in my ring just because
I make it visible to others. I do not give up my property right even if I
“misplace” my ring by leaving it on a bathroom sink, “lose” it by
dropping it on the floor, or fail to guard it well enough from a thief. In

329
At least one attempt by an individual to sell personal information has been
recorded. See Diane Anderson, Woman Auctions Personal Info Online (June 15, 2000),
available at http://www.pcworld.com/resource/printable/article/0,aid,17199,00.asp. In
June 2000, Tracy Coyle tried to auction off information about herself. Id. She answered 378
questions commonly asked by marketers regarding her financial status, health, and
religious beliefs, but no one made a bid. Id. A year later Coyle started a website company,
www.Itsmyprofile.com, which aspires to make it possible for consumers to sell their
personal data directly to advertisers. See Julia Scheers, My Shoe Size? It’ll Cost You (June 11,
2001), available at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,44278,00.html.
“Your
information is just that  yours,” says Coyle. Id. “If someone else benefits from that
information, you deserve compensation for its use.” Id. Coyle’s current goal is to attract
20,000 members to make her member profiles marketable. Id. She plans to charge
advertisers 14 cents to access each member’s 1,300-question profiles and 25 cents to send
members e-mails, which are routed through her site to avoid their resale. Id.
330
See NIMMER, supra note 98, ¶ 16.08, at 16-24 (analogizing privacy law to trade secrecy
and suggesting that intimate details of life disclosed in autobiography are not private and
any property interest in respect thereto is waived).
331
See discussion supra notes 101-04, 186-87 and accompanying text.
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other words, I do not lose a property right unless I make an affirmative
decision to relinquish control over it. By the same token, I do not publish
personal information just because I make bits and pieces of it visible to
others, or because someone manages to collect or steal it.
Recognizing the special nature of personal information, the law should
protect it from involuntary transfers such as a judgment lien, although a
332
voluntary pledge should be enforceable. The pledgee should be able to
perfect their security interest in personal information, just like in any
other intangible, by filing a financing statement in the domicile of the
pledgor  the same way security interests in customer lists are perfected
333
now.
In bankruptcy, the law should provide for an exclusion of
personal information from the estate of the individual, analogously to
how state insolvency laws currently exclude certain personal
334
possessions.
The law should vest in the individual certain inalienable rights such as
the right to obtain one’s records, to demand correction of errors, and to
335
block or erase any incomplete or inaccurate information even after all
other rights to it have been transferred. Similar approaches may be seen,
336
337
for instance, in European legislation protecting “moral rights” of
332
For a similar treatment of certain property, see Uniform Exemptions Act, UNIF.
EXEMPTIONS ACT § 8(a)(3), 13 U.L.A. 298 (2002) (exempting from application of judicial lien,
among other things, family portraits and heirlooms of particular sentimental value to the
individual).
333
See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1998) (listing requirements for perfection of security interest in
intangibles).
334
For a similar treatment of certain property in bankruptcy, see BANKR. CODE, 11
U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000) (providing individual debtor with choice between exemptions
authorized by Bankruptcy Code, other federal law, and state law); BANKR. CODE, 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(3) & (4) (authorizing exemptions of various property that is held “primarily for the
personal, family or household use of the debtor”). For an example of state debtor-creditor
law exemptions, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205(a) (McKinney 2003) (exempting from application
of judicial lien, among other things, family bible, family pictures, seat or pew in place of
worship, various household items, wedding ring, watch, etc., all subject to value
limitations).
335
The European Union Data Protection Directive includes a similar principle. See Data
Protection Directive, supra note 2, art. 12 (investing data subject with right to obtain
records, correct errors, and block or erase any incomplete or inaccurate information).
336
See Samuelson, supra note 300, at 1147 (noting that many countries protect moral
rights, but two most commonly discussed are France and Germany, and providing
examples of protection of moral rights in these two countries); see also Law on the Intellectual
Property Code, No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG.,
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS, LAWS AND TREATIES (1996) [hereinafter French Act];
Urheberrechtgesetz (UrhG) § IV.2, arts. 12-14, available at http://iecl.iuscomp.org/gla
/statutes/UrhG.htm [hereinafter German Act].
337
Samuelson, supra note 300, at 1147 (listing such commonly recognized moral rights
as right of attribution (i.e., right to be identified as author of work); right of integrity (i.e.,
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authors even after copyright has been sold. The moral rights regime is
based on the idea that artistic and literary creations are more than just a
commodity; rather, they are “emanations of the author’s personality in
which he can and should retain an interest even after copies of the work
338
have entered the stream of commerce.” Some countries consider moral
339
rights sufficiently important and vulnerable to make them inalienable.
The inalienability regime is justified in this case by the dual nature of
privacy (it is both a personal right and a social value) and by the
legitimate interest of society in the accuracy of publicized information.
340
Under the Calabresi-Melamed rules, inalienability is warranted when
people seek to avoid non-monetary externalities and impose on
themselves a restriction, so that “they will be prevented from yielding to
341
momentary temptations which they deem harmful to themselves.” If a
significant number of people chose, for instance, to waive the rights
described above in exchange for coupons, the society as a whole would
be hurt.
Making rights inalienable is particularly justified in
circumstances involving information asymmetry and collective action
problems (which is currently the case in the area of information
342
privacy),
because those systemic problems increase the risk of
343
irrational decisionmaking by individuals.

right to protect work from alterations that would be harmful to author’s reputation); right
of “divulgation” (i.e., right to decide when and under what circumstances to divulge
work); and, recognized in some jurisdictions, right of withdrawal (i.e., right to withdraw all
published copies of work if work no longer represents author’s views or otherwise would
be detrimental to author’s reputation)). For examples of French law, see French Act, supra
note 336, art. L. 121-1 (codifying rights of attribution and integrity), art. L. 121-2 (codifying
right of divulgation), and art. L. 121-4 (codifying right of withdrawal). For examples of
German law, see German Act, supra note 336, art. 13 (codifying right of attribution), art. 14
(codifying right of integrity), and art. 12 (codifying right of divulgation).
338
Samuelson, supra note 300, at 1146.
339
See id. (discussing France as example of jurisdiction that made moral rights
inalienable to protect them against unfair contractual overrides). For a general discussion
of the actual inalienability of moral rights in Europe see Neil Netanel, Alienability
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental
Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 7, 48 n.254-305 (1994) (arguing that essential
moral rights are properly considered to be inalienable under Continental law).
340
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 195, at 1111-13; see also Radin, Market-Inalienability,
supra note 266, at 1903-36 (arguing that, in name of human flourishing, certain personal
interests should remain inalienable).
341
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 195, at 1113. One example of such restriction
would be a law prohibiting selling oneself into slavery. Id. at 1112.
342
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 106, at 822 (pointing out that there are significant
information asymmetries and collective action problems regarding privacy on Internet).
343
To address the same concern, the law should also impose implied warranties (e.g.,
accuracy and transferability) on any transferor of personal information with the individual
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Other rights in personal information should be freely transferable
upon individual consent. That consent may take different forms. It
could be an outright sale, in which case both the original and the
secondary collector would be free to transfer the personal information to
whomever they want. Alternatively, the consent may be in the form of a
transferee-, industry-, or purpose-specific license, either free of any
restrictions or subject to certain limitations on future transfers. That
license, for instance, could completely block dissemination of some of the
provided information and allow sharing of other information only with
entities of a particular type (e.g., located in the United States or having a
similar privacy protection policy). Presumably, the price would reflect
the difference in the scope of the transferred rights. That way,
individuals could control the type of information a business may transfer
into the secondary market. For instance, if the licensee failed to follow
the terms of the transaction, the individual could revoke the license or
344
petition a court for an injunction.
Others have suggested that individual consent should be required not
only for transfers of personal information but also for its collection and
345
internal use by a company.
In my view, such a requirement is
excessively harsh on businesses and also unnecessary. As long as
collected information is used for product development, research, and
general marketing strategies, individual privacy does not suffer. Any
communications with customers or potential customers certainly must
be consensual  but that is true even in the absence of any direct

being a third party beneficiary of those warranties. See Mell, supra note 16, at 79
(suggesting that “[t]he privilege of the holder to use and disclose the persona [should]
carry a double warranty: a warranty of authority to disclose and a warranty of accuracy.”).
That would protect interests of both the individual and society, especially if the current
trend of accumulation of personal information by commercial enterprises continues and
certain enterprises start specializing in assembling and selling individual personal profiles.
344
See Basho, supra note 32, at 1525 (promoting license agreements as means to regulate
use and transfer of personal information). A proposed licensing agreement might provide:
I grant Company X the right to distribute my name only to third parties with
privacy policies equal to Company X’s until 1/1/02 and I will receive $2.00 each
time my name is transferred to such a third party. After 1/1/02, Company X
must cease all use of this information and will no longer have any rights or
interest in it.
Id.
345
Id. A licensing agreement proposed by Basho includes the following language:
“Company X is authorized to collect my name, address, income, and online buying habits.
It may use this information to determine what products I will be most interested in buying,
to make decisions about its own product development, and to send me emails about
changes to this product.” Id.
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relationship between a business and an individual. Telemarketers’ calls
in the middle of a dinner are no less annoying because the caller
obtained your phone number from local “white pages,” rather than
directly from you.
Irrespective of the chosen form of a transaction, the consent of the
individual should be affirmative (based on the “opt-in” model) and
informed, in writing and conspicuous on its face. In addition, the law
should prohibit a collector to condition doing business with an
346
individual on obtaining such consent.
This last requirement poses
some interesting questions.
The first general question is how to justify this restriction? Normally,
if an individual is free to sell, pledge, or otherwise transfer her property,
a counterparty is equally free to demand a transfer of that property in
consideration for entering into a transaction. Why forbid a collector (e.g.,
Yahoo!) from requiring that individuals provide their personal
information as consideration for gaining access to Yahoo! databases?
The reasons for that restriction are in the inequality of bargaining
positions of an individual and a service provider like Yahoo!, and in the
risk of injury to individuals’ privacy inherent in that inequality.
Similar
considerations
stand
behind
the
doctrines
of
“unconscionability” and “adhesion,” which permit courts to refuse
enforcement of coerced agreements. The doctrine of unconscionability
has been applied most frequently in areas where there is an inequality of
347
bargaining power “to protect those who cannot protect themselves.”
An agreement may be held unconscionable if it takes away some
348
important rights of a consumer, including a waiver of defense clause, a
349
disclaimer of some or all warranties, or consent to repossession of an
350
item sold on credit if a seller “deems itself insecure.” A forced consent

346
Today, many websites do not allow access to Internet users unless they provide their
personal information. See, e.g., Schober et al., supra note 45, at 721 (referring to New York
Times website, which effectively provides that “if you will not sign in and disgorge
personal information, then you can’t read the paper online.”).
347
Hertz Corp. v. Attorney Gen. of New York, 518 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707-08 (N.Y. 1987); see
also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.”).
348
See Chem. Bank v. Rinden Prof’l Ass’n, 498 A.2d 706, 714 (N.H. 1985) (holding that
“neither the waiver itself, nor the manner in which it was executed, was unconscionable”).
349
See Rottinghaus v. Howell, 666 P.2d 899, 903-05 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
disclaimer of warranties unconscionable where disclaimer provisions were overbroad, not
bargained for, and not specifically agreed upon).
350
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 163 (5th ed.
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to the transfer of personal information takes away an equally important
right of consumers  their right to privacy  and should be seen as
equally unconscionable.
An adhesion contract is typically a standardized form “offered to
consumers of goods and services on essentially a ‘take it or leave it’ basis
without affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain and
under such conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the desired
351
product or services except by acquiescing in the form contract.”
The
distinctive feature of a contract of adhesion is that “the weaker party has
352
no realistic choice as to its terms.”
A requirement that, in order to
receive goods or services, a consumer must sign a standard, nonnegotiable consent form permitting the collector to transfer the
consumer’s personal information squarely fits under the definition of an
adhesion contract.
The same public policy that makes courts interfere with adhesion
contracts (to avoid systematic unfair advantage by a more sophisticated
party with overwhelmingly stronger bargaining opportunities) should
be followed to protect individuals from collectors who may require their
customers to consent to the transfer of their personal information as a
condition of doing business. A consent obtained by such an ultimatum
should be considered unconscionable and a contract of adhesion. That
agreement should be null and void ab initio; any further transfer
pursuant to that agreement should be deemed unauthorized and thus
actionable against the collector and anyone who has obtained consumer
information from it.
What if the original collector does not explicitly refuse to transact with
an individual but instead offers different prices for its goods or services?
For example, you can have this book for $5 if you consent to any further
transfer of your personal information but, without such consent, it will
cost you $15. At which point does this price differential become punitive
and in fact block the transaction? Perhaps, this issue should be left for
courts to decide  they are experienced in reviewing similar disputes
when deciding, for instance, whether liquidated damages provided for
2000) (listing examples of substantive unconscionability).
351
Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); see also
Burkons v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of Cal., 798 P.2d 1308, 1320 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), rev’d on
other grounds, 813 P.2d 710 (Ariz. 1991) (explaining that essence of adhesion contract is that
it is offered to consumers on essentially “take it or leave it” basis).
352
Wheeler, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 356; see also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion 
Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943) (concluding that
essence of adhesion contract is that bargaining position and leverage enable one party to
select and control risks assumed under contract).
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353

in an agreement are reasonable or whether a foreclosure sale was at
354
fair market value. The determination of substantive unconscionability
355
pursuant to section 2-302 of the U.C.C. often turns on the question of
356
whether a contractual price was excessive.
A court may find a price
excessive because “it returns too great a profit to the seller, or because it
yields too great a return on the seller’s invested capital, or because it is a
substantially higher price than other merchants similarly or unsimilarly
357
situated charge for like items.” Analogous criteria may be applied by a
court to determine whether the price attached to the individual’s
personal information is commercially reasonable or excessive and,
therefore, punitive and impermissible.
The original collector in the proposed legal structure would be able to
freely use any personal information collected by it in the course of selling
goods or services to its customers, but only internally. In the modern
corporate world full of corporate giants, mergers and acquisitions, the
meaning of “internal use” would need to be defined. I would suggest
that affiliates and subsidiaries be allowed to enjoy the same kind of
automatic license as the original collector itself, but only affiliates and

353
See, e.g., John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1574-75 (D. Kan.
1986) (concluding that liquidated damages clause on purchase option price before option
matured was punitive and not enforceable); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Hesco Constr.,
Inc. 614 P.2d 1302, 1306-07 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (opining that fair damages formula was
not penalty).
354
See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (deciding whether foreclosure
sale was conducted legally and fairly); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Maplewood Invs., 31 F.3d
1276, 1278-79 (4th Cir. 1994) (reversing trial court’s decision to bar creditor-purchaser from
obtaining deficiency judgment because property sale was improper due to conflict of
interest on part of trustee and officers); OMP v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Fin., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 251,
254 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (holding foreclosure sale was conducted in equitable manner because
there was no improper conduct even though lender bid amount was substantially below
amount of indebtedness).
355
See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998), which states:

If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
356
See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 350, at 158 (noting that one of two groups of
cases where courts most often find clauses to be unconscionable is excessive-price cases).
357
Id. at 161; see also Am. Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 888 (N.H.
1964) (finding price excessive because mark-up was too high); State ex rel. Lefkowitz v.
ITM, Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321-22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (finding price excessive because it
was significantly higher than price charged by other merchants for same or similar goods).
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wholly-owned subsidiaries in the same line of business.
For other
affiliates and subsidiaries, consent of the individual should be required,
just as for any other transfer of personal information from an original
359
collector to the secondary market.
VIII. ENFORCEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL’S PROPERTY RIGHT IN PERSONAL
INFORMATION
Finally, a few words regarding the enforcement of these rights. The
proposed statute should provide for a private cause of action, legal fees
(which may be denied in case of a frivolous lawsuit), injunctive relief,
and damages. The damages should be the higher of actual damages and
a certain statutory amount. This amount may be a fixed sum or may be
calculated for each day of violation, analogously to the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, which provides for the higher of $10,000
360
or $100 per each day of violation.
In the case of an unauthorized
transfer of personal information, a fixed amount would be more
appropriate, whereas in a situation where the defendant refuses to
correct inaccurate personal information, a per diem amount would
probably make more sense. In addition, criminal penalties, similar to
those provided by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, should be available to
penalize any officer or employee of a company who knowingly and

358
See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Modern Studies in Privacy Law: Notice, Autonomy and
Enforcement of Data Privacy Legislation, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1263, 1311 (2002) (advocating
limiting inter-affiliate sharing of information to affiliates in same line of business).
359
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, for example, has been widely criticized for allowing
inter-affiliate sharing of personal information. See, e.g., Ralph Nader, Banking Jackpot,
WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at A33 (“The affiliates of the conglomerates and their
telemarketers will be free to share many intimate details of an individual’s buying habits,
investing patterns, health records, entertainment choices, employment data and other
aspects of one’s existence.”); see also Cuaresma, supra note 66, at 512. Cuaresma explains:

Even though Congress explicitly directs each financial institution to “respect the
privacy of its customers,” customers cannot opt-out of information sharing
between affiliates. Allowing a single company to engage in banking, securities,
and insurance activities increases the secondary uses of such information. For
example, once a banking division obtains nonpublic personal information, there
is no legal roadblock to prevent it from sharing that information with its
insurance and securities divisions.
Id. at 512.
360
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 252(c)(2), 100 Stat.
1848 (1986) (providing for recovery of greater of (A) sum of actual damages suffered by
plaintiff and any profits made by violator as result of violation, or (B) greater of $100 day
for each day of violation and $ 10,000); see also Mell, supra note 16, at 79 (advocating similar
penalties for unauthorized dissemination of personal information).
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willfully supplies information concerning an individual from the
361
company’s files to a person not authorized to receive that information.
Legislation based on such principles would adequately protect the
respective interests of American businesses and consumers and would
bring U.S. law into accord with the developing body of international law
regarding treatment of personal information.
CONCLUSION
As I was finishing this Article, my eleven-year-old daughter received a
junk-mail letter with some Internet-related advertisements in it. The
letter was addressed to a Sue Grong (a fictitious name my daughter has
used a few times on various websites), but our home address was
absolutely correct. “Why did you give them our real address?” I asked.
“But I did not,” she replied, “I gave them a non-existing address in New
York City.” “So how did they get our address?” I started to say, and
then I stopped. . . .
362
By the way, Peter Steiner’s cartoon had a sequel.

361
See United States Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508 (1970), as amended
by Pub. L. 104-208 § 620, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (providing for maximum two-year
imprisonment for “[a]ny officer or employee of consumer reporting agency who knowingly
and willfully supplies information concerning an individual from the agency’s files to a
person not authorized to receive that information”); see also Mell, supra note 16, at 79
(suggesting similar penalty for unauthorized willful disclosures).
362
Anonymizer, at http://web.archive.org/web/19970403034059/www.anonymizer.
com/cartoon.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2003) (the website’s motto is: “Because on today’s
Internet, people do know you’re a dog”).
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